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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1932 to 1969, the United States Supreme Court "incorpo-
rated" most of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights
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into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 thereby
rendering those provisions binding on state and local governments. 2
Before and during that time, jurists and legal scholars vigorously de-
bated the constitutional legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment
"doctrine of incorporation."3 Despite the apparent stability of the
post-1969 standoff in the Supreme Court,4 the controversy over "incor-
poration" has continued to rage.5 Whether considering the status of
the few remaining "unincorporated" rights, evaluating "total incorpo-
ration" theories, or defending or criticizing the status quo, "incorpora-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall'.., deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law.").
2. Of the eleven specific criminal procedure provisions enumerated in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, all but the right to grand jury indictment have
been "incorporated" against the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
148-49 & nn.4-14 (1968) (summarizing "incorporation" cases); but cf Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (refusing to "incorporate" Fifth Amendment's
grand jury indictment requirement); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633
(1972) (reaffirming that "the Court [still] has never held that federal concepts of a
'grand jury,' binding on the federal courts under the Fifth Amendment, are obli-
gatory for the States").
3. See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Un-
derstanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1067-78 (2000) (recounting his-
tory of scholarly and judicial debate over this subject); see also Michael Kent Cur-
tis, John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets
the "Lost Clause," 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 621, 623-25 & n.30 (2003) (same). The
scholarly and judicial debate over "incorporation" goes beyond the criminal proce-
dure provisions set forth in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. It also
encompasses the important substantive personal liberties guaranteed by the
First and, arguably, Second, Eighth, and even Ninth Amendments. However, dis-
cussion of protection of substantive personal liberties against state interference
(as opposed to protection of procedural rights of criminal defendants and suspects
in state criminal process) is beyond the scope of this Article.
4. See, e.g., Wildenthal, supra note 3, at 1055 ("The incorporation debate, at a super-
ficial level, seems settled today as a matter of black-letter law. Not since 1969
has the Court either included or excluded from the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment any provision of the Bill of Rights.").
5. In 1999, for example, California Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown as-
serted that "[t]he historical evidence supporting [the doctrine of incorporation] is
pretty sketchy. [The Supreme Court] relied on some historical materials which
are not overwhelming. The argument on the other side is pretty overwhelming,
and it is probably not incorporated." Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Janice R. Brown, of California, to be Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia
Circuit: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. S. Hrg. No.
108-463, at 62 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary). When public opposition later threatened that justice's appoint-
ment to the United States Court of Appeals, the nominee distanced herself from
her 1999 statement. See id. (statement ofJ. Janice R. Brown) ("I have since actu-
ally found a lot of other things going the other way in dealing with the debates at
the time of the post-Civil War amendments, which suggests that some of that
might have been there .... [T]here certainly may be . . . argument on both
sides.").
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tion" opponents 6 and proponents 7 alike have agreed that the ultimate
resolution of the "incorporation" debate will have meaningful, practi-
cal effects on the legal rights of people throughout the United States.
Despite such widespread agreement, however, no systematic at-
tempt has been made to measure the extent to which "incorporation"
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments has shaped the contours
of state criminal procedure as it is practiced. At first glance, it is not
clear why "incorporation" should exert significant impact. After all,
every state constitution contains a bill of rights that significantly over-
laps the United States Bill of Rights.8 Moreover, state court interpre-
tations of state bills of rights have long been influenced by federal
court interpretations of the United States Bill of Rights.9 For this rea-
son, even if "incorporation" had never occurred, most state cases de-
cided under the "incorporated" Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
seemingly should be expected to come out the same way under analo-
gous state constitutional provisions.1O
6. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
5 (1989) ("Whether the Bill of Rights applies to the States by virtue of the Four-
teenth Amendment presents a momentous question. For if it does not, many
modern decisions of the Supreme Court-e.g., respecting ... Fourth Amendment
search and seizure, Fifth Amendment criminal procedure, issues the Founders
left to the States-are without constitutional warrant.").
7. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 3 (1986) ("The idea
that protection of human liberty under the Bill of Rights against state action is
the result of judicial whim or judicial usurpation eats like acid at the legitimacy
of federal protection of civil liberty.").
8. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 282 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) ("The states
have survived with the nation through great vicissitudes, for the greater part of
our history, without wide departures or numerous ones from the plan of the Bill
of Rights. They accepted that plan for the nation when they ratified those
amendments."). The principle that state government power may be limited by
state constitutions is reflected in the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the
United States .... nor prohibited ... to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the People.") (emphasis added). By including the qualifying
language "or to the People," the Framers recognized that, within each state, not
all powers would necessarily be delegated to the state government. Id.
9. See infra Part III; see also Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State
Court "Revolution," 74 JUDICATURE 190, 190-91 (1991) (finding that state courts
of last resort adopted United States Supreme Court reasoning and result in two-
thirds of all criminal procedure cases decided under state constitutions during
the 1970s and 1980s).
10. Cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 738-39 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("It must be remembered that for the first century of this Nation's history, the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States was solely a protection for
the individual in relation to federal authorities. State Constitutions protected
the liberties of the people of the several States from abuse by state authorities.
The Bill of Rights is now largely applicable to state authorities and is the ulti-
mate guardian of individual rights. The States in our federal system, however,
remain the primary guardian of the liberty of the people.").
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Undoubtedly, the "doctrine of incorporation" would have tremen-
dous practical significance if the specification of constitutional rights
varied from state to state. In theory, the texts of the separate state
bills of rights could recite different rights from one another. In addi-
tion, judicial interpretations of textually similar guarantees in sepa-
rate state constitutions could diverge over time. States also could
repeal existing state bills of rights provisions.ll They could add new
rights not protected by the United States Constitution. 12 Experimen-
tation by the states in all these respects could lead to innovation, and
perhaps to productive competition among the states. 13 If so, then "in-
corporation" of the United States Bill of Rights would constrain each
state by requiring maintenance of a uniform national core of civil lib-
erties protections.
In practice, however, with respect to criminal procedure, such di-
versity simply is not found. The criminal procedure provisions of most
of the state bills of rights are nearly identical to one another and to
the United States Bill of Rights.14 Variations in constitutional lan-
guage have been interpreted by state courts as cosmetic and inadver-
tent. In particular, the absence of a particular textual guarantee from
a given state constitution, more often than not, has not discouraged
courts in the state at issue from protecting the right. 15 Moreover, to
the extent that there has been experimentation, the experiment seems
to be all but over. Virtually every right enumerated in the United
States Bill of Rights has been embraced widely in the fifty states.
11. State constitutions are amended and replaced far more frequently than the Fed-
eral Constitution. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that denial of legal benefits of civil marriage to same-sex couples violates
state constitutional principles). The "incorporation doctrine" does not prevent
states from protecting new rights that are not protected under the United States
Constitution.
13. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.");
cf Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 819 n.215 (1995) ("[T]he
creation of a decentralized competitive market in criminal procedure rules would
allow innocent citizens ultimately to shape the development of criminal proce-
dure by voting with their feet.").
14. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 205 (1998) ("With a few exceptions,
most notably the grand-jury rules . . . , the substance of the federal Bill's rights
and freedoms did not greatly diverge from rights already formally protected
under state laws and state constitutions."); WILLiAM E. NELSON, THE FouR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 118
(1988); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
YALE L.J. 1385, 1465 (1992).
15. See infra Part III.
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Since 1791, state bills of rights have been amended overwhelmingly
towards greater conformity with the United States Constitution, and
almost never away from such conformity.16
For this reason, standard accounts of the "doctrine of incorpora-
tion" may overstate the extent to which the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution protect the rights of
criminal defendants more strongly than typical state law. This over-
statement perhaps stems from the fact that the Supreme Court did, in
fact, have occasion to "incorporate" ten substantive rights recited in
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments-and to reverse state court
decisions in so doing. If state courts have failed, at one time or an-
other, to protect each of the ten rights that have been "incorporated"
by the Supreme Court, then it might appear that the application of
federal constitutional norms to state criminal processes necessarily ef-
fected significant substantive impositions on state criminal procedure
law.
Closer examination, however, reveals a more complex, but less dra-
matic, story. In several "incorporation" cases, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed decisions in which state courts had labored
earnestly to apply federal constitutional doctrine. 17 State courts in
these cases did not reject federal interpretations of the Bill of Rights,
but rather simply failed to correctly predict the Supreme Court's dis-
position of certain close legal questions. In other cases, the Supreme
Court announced the "incorporation" of United States constitutional
norms, but minimized the impact of these announcements by continu-
ing to permit significant variation among the states in the implemen-
tation of such norms.18 Several "incorporation" cases did little more
than to require one or two outlying states to modify relatively minor
16. The sole exception to this generalization, in the criminal procedure context, con-
cerns the only right set forth in the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment that the
Supreme Court has expressly declined to incorporate: the right to grand jury in-
dictment. Most states have altered or abolished grand jury indictment. See Rich-
ard E. Shugrue, The Grand Jury In Nebraska, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 39, 45-54
(1999) (tracing state decisions to abolish right to grand jury indictment). Outside
the criminal procedure context, many state constitutions also have been amended
towards greater conformity with the United States Constitution by the ratifica-
tion of state constitutional rights to bear arms. See Eugene Volokh, State Consti-
tutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions, by Date, http://
wwwl.law.ucla.edu/-volokh/beararms/statedat.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005)
(listing 15 states in which "right to bear arms" provisions have been added to
state constitutions since 1970). The Second Amendment right to bear arms has
never been "incorporated" against the states. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S.
252, 265 (1886). Discussion of the right to bear arms is beyond the scope of this
Article.
17. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). All of these cases are discussed infra.
18. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 & n.30 (1968) (incorporating
Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury trial, but declining to incorporate Sixth
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details of their state criminal practice.19 A handful of "incorporation"
cases did have potential to impose paradigm-shifting changes on crim-
inal procedure in many states2O-until, as always happened, the Su-
preme Court retreated from the implications of its holdings. 2 1
By closely examining the state court proceedings underlying the
Supreme Court's "incorporation" decisions that fit into each of these
categories, this Article demonstrates that "incorporation" of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments did not require modification of
state criminal procedure to nearly the extent commonly supposed.
Part I recounts the history of the "incorporation" debate. Part II ex-
plains why variation in the language set forth in various state bills of
rights has rarely been reflected by corresponding differences in state
criminal procedure. Finally, in order to determine the extent to which
"incorporation" reshaped state criminal procedure, Part III reviews
the facts and holdings of the state court decisions underlying the Su-
preme Court's "incorporation" cases, and also surveys the law of other
states whose constitutions lacked express analogues to United States
constitutional provisions.
II. THE INCORPORATION DEBATE
Since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,
courts and commentators have struggled with the question whether
the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the guarantees of the first
eight or nine Amendments as limits on state power. Although the
first federal court to face the question held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause achieved such an ef-
fect, 22 the Supreme Court apparently rejected this interpretation
when it first construed the Clause. 23 Nineteenth century commenta-
Amendment doctrines concerning jury size, jury unanimity, or jury waiver). This
case is discussed infra.
19. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967); Oliver, 333 U.S. 257; Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (each
affecting only one state); see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (affect-
ing six states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (affecting five states).
All of these cases are discussed infra Part III.
20. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Both of these cases are discussed infra.
21. See infra Part III (discussing the Court's retreat from Miranda and Mapp).
22. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (holding that "the
right of freedom of speech, and the other rights enumerated in the first eight
articles of amendment to the constitution of the United States, are the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States," secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment against state action); accord United States v. Mall, 26 F. Cas. 1147
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (same).
23. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Formally, the Slaughter-
House Cases held the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not bar a state from awarding a butchering monopoly to a preferred
[Vol. 84:397
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tors were nearly unanimous in criticizing this decision in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases as a judicial abrogation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24 Even the few commentators who applauded the
Slaughter-House Cases decision agreed that neither the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor its ratifiers' intent, supported the
Court's holding.25
vendor, and prohibiting independent butchers from pursuing their trade. Id. at
78. However, certain dicta in the majority opinion was widely understood for
more than a century to have effectively nullified the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. See, e.g., Wildenthal, supra note 3, at 1063-66 (describing nineteenth
and twentieth century judicial interpretations of the Slaughter-House Cases).
But c.f Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Rein-
terpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000) (arguing that
courts and commentators misconstrued the holding in the Slaughter-House
Cases, and that all nine Justices in the Slaughter-House Cases actually accepted
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against states those rights enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights). Misconstrued or not, the Slaughter-House Cases
stunted the development of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a vehicle for
implementing the "doctrine of incorporation." Wildenthal, supra note 3, at 1064
& nn.46-47. Indeed, until 1999, the Slaughter-House Cases also stunted the de-
velopment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for federal protection
of intrastate equality with respect to state law rights. But see Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999) (holding that Privileges or Immunities Clause conveys on all
United States citizens a right to obtain state citizenship in any state in which
residence is taken, with rights and privileges equal to that of incumbent citizens).
Although both "selective" incorporation and protection of certain unenumerated
rights have subsequently been achieved via the Due Process Clause, and intra-
state equality has been achieved in certain contexts via the Equal Protection
Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause still has never provided a significant
basis for judicial protection of individual rights.
24. See, e.g., JOHN NORTON POMEROY, INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 765-67 (3d ed. 1868) ("I am of opinion that the fundamental position taken by
the minority in the Slaughter House Case, the broad, general principle of inter-
pretation adopted by them is correct, and that it will in time be universally ac-
cepted."); accord 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 228-30 (1890); WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE
FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 60-65 (1898); Charles R. Pence, The Construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 25 AM. L. REV. 536 (1891); William L. Royall, The Fourteenth
Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, 4 S. L. REV. N.S. 558 (1878).
25. See, e.g., Walter D. Coles, Politics and the Supreme Court of the United States, 27
AM. L. REV. 182, 206 (1893) ("Never was the court truer to itself, and truer to the
constitution, than when it passed upon the momentous question involved in the
Slaughter-House Cases. A literal interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
would have destroyed local self-government, reduced the States to the condition
of mere provinces, and swept away that Federal fabric which our fathers had
builded [sic] with such painful and loving care. That such a result was contem-
plated by the political leaders who secured the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment is certain. But the high patriotism of the Supreme Court led it to construe
this amendment in accordance with the traditions and true spirit of our constitu-
tion, and to preserve to our people the inestimable advantages of local self-gov-
ernment.") (citations omitted and emphasis added).
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Nonetheless, for the next quarter century, the Supreme Court con-
sidered and rejected a series of claims that specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights had been "incorporated" against the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 26 Finally, in 1897, after repeatedly rejecting such
claims, the Court construed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as having implicitly "incorporated" the "just compensa-
tion" requirement of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 27 After
this 1897 decision, however, the Court reverted for another quarter
century to rejecting other "incorporation" claims.28
Between 1925 and 1969, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier
course, "incorporating" as limits on state power almost all of the enu-
merated rights expressly guaranteed by the First through Eighth
Amendments.29 Midway through that process, in 1947, Justice Hugo
Black announced a theory of "total incorporation" of the Bill of Rights
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
26. See McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 158-60 (1891) (finding that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not "incorporate" Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment); Spies v. Illinois (The Anarchists' Case), 123 U.S. 131
(1887) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not "incorporate" Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, or Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury);
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (finding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not "incorporate" Second Amendment right to bear arms); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not "incorporate" Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment); Mis-
souri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not "incorporate" Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury trial); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1876) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not "incorporate" Second Amendment right to bear arms or
First Amendment right to freely assemble); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1875) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not "incorporate" Seventh
Amendment right to civil jury trial).
27. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897)
("[T]he requirement of due process of law in [the Fourteenth] amendment is ap-
plicable to the direct appropriation by the State to public use and without com-
pensation of the private property of the citizen. The legislature may prescribe a
form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for public use,
but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for compensation.").
28. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922) (Fourteenth
Amendment does not "incorporate" First Amendment right to freedom of speech),
overruled in pertinent part by Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-14 (1908) (Fourteenth Amendment does
not "incorporate" Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination), overruled in
part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 594-96
(1900) (Fourteenth Amendment does not "incorporate" Sixth Amendment right to
a criminal jury trial), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Brown
v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174-77 (1899) (Fourteenth Amendment does not
"incorporate" Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury), overruled in pertinent
part by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
29. See infra Part III.
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Amendment.30 While Justice Black's view never commanded a Court
majority, the Court did embrace Justice Cardozo's earlier formulation
of "absorption" (later called "selective incorporation"), via the Due Pro-
cess Clause, of those particular enumerated rights that were elements
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."31 Applying this
formulation since 1925, the Court has nominally "incorporated"
against the states virtually every right enumerated in the first eight
Amendments.32
The application of United States constitutional principles to state
criminal procedure proved tremendously controversial. Initially, de-
bate focused on the historical legitimacy of the "incorporation" the-
sis. 33 While this historical debate continues,3 4 attention soon was
brought to bear on "incorporation's" practical effects. Without "incor-
poration," "incorporation" proponent Charles Black argued,
[W]e ought to stop saying, "One nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for
all," and speak instead of, "One nation divisible and divided into fifty zones of
political morality, with liberty and justice in such kind and measure as these
good things may from time to time be granted by each of these fifty political
subdivisions."3 5
30. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J. dissenting), over-
ruled in part by Malloy, 378 U.S. 1.
31. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
32. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49 & nn.4-14 (surveying "incorporation" cases). To
date, the Supreme Court has refused to "incorporate" only the Second Amend-
ment right to bear arms, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), the Fifth
Amendment right to grand jury indictment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
538 (1884), and the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases, Walker
v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876). The Court has never had occasion to decide
whether the Third Amendment's guarantee against quartering soldiers is "incor-
porated" into the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on state power, though one
lower federal court has held that it is. See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961
(2d Cir. 1982).
33. For two famous challenges to the historical legitimacy of "incorporation," see
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Stanley Morrison,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Judicial In-
terpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 162-70 (1949). Five years after it was pub-
lished, Fairman's historical analysis was refuted by William Crosskey. See
William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Con-
stitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954). But see
Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144 (1954)
(defending anti-incorporationist thesis).
34. See Pamela Brandwein, Dueling Histories: Charles Fairman and William Cross-
key Reconstruct "Original Understanding," 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 289, 291-92,
300-01 (1996) (surveying ongoing historical debate between successors of Fair-
man and Crosskey).
35. Charles L. Black, Jr., "One Nation Indivisible": Unnamed Human Rights in the
States, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 17, 55 (1991); accord William W. Van Alstyne, Fore-
word to MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, at vii, ix (1986) ("[I]t is
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"Incorporation," in contrast, would force "certain of our states ... to
mend their ways . . . [and] to observe all the provisions of this Bill of
Rights that Americans have long been taught to revere."36 To many,
the "doctrine of incorporation" seemed necessary to ensure the mainte-
nance of civil liberty in the United States.3 7
Opponents of "incorporation" expressed different, though similarly
emphatic, concerns about the doctrine's effects. To "apply the Bill of
Rights to the states through the due process clause [is to] weaken the
states tremendously by handing over control of large areas of public
policy to the federal judges," remarked one federal judge. 38 At stake
in the "incorporation" debate, argued Raoul Berger, was "the integrity
of the Constitution, the right of the people to govern themselves, for
instance, to require death penalties even though they offend the sensi-
bilities of the Justices."39 Seeking to demonstrate the detrimental
practical effects of "incorporation," "incorporation" opponent Charles
Rice posed (and answered) the following rhetorical question:
When a twelve-year-old girl was shot and killed not long ago in... Chicago's
Cabrini-Green housing project, why could the police not respond to the de-
mands of residents and columnists that they search the project, seize all the
illegal weapons, and arrest their possessors?
.... The answer.., is that the states and communities are prevented from
doing anything because of the incorporation doctrine.4 0
Contrary to Berger's implication, however, the "doctrine of incorpo-
ration" has not forced states to abandon capital punishment.4 1 Moreo-
difficult to imagine a more consequential subject than [incorporation], short of
pulling back the Bill of Rights even from the federal government itself.").
36. Crosskey, supra note 33, at 1.
37. See Curtis, supra note 3, at 623 ("Without application of free speech, press, peti-
tion, and assembly guarantees to the states, the Southern states [in the 1960s
and 1970s] could have done more to suppress the Civil Rights Movement's dissent
against their racial caste system.").
38. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 195 (1985); accord
Edwin Meese, U.S. Att'y Gen., Address to the American Bar Association (July 9,
1985), in MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, at viii (1986) ("No-
where else ... has the principle of federalism been dealt so politically violent and
constitutionally suspect a blow as by the theory of incorporation.").
39. BERGER, supra note 6, at 147.
40. Charles Rice, The Bill of Rights and the Doctrine of Incorporation, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 11, 11-12 (Eugene W.
Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991).
41. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1976) (holding that "capital punish-
ment is not invalid per se" because, inter alia, "the Fourteenth Amendment...
contemplates the existence of the capital sanction in providing that no State shall
deprive any person of 'life, liberty, or property' without due process of law").
Under the "doctrine of incorporation," states now are barred from executing chil-
dren, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), or mentally retarded adults,
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). However, state executions of such per-
sons had become extraordinarily rare by the time the Supreme Court held such
executions constitutionally impermissible. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-93 (dis-
cussing rarity); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16 (same).
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ver, contrary to Rice's claim, "incorporation" is not the only reason
Chicago police could not forcibly enter private apartments without
probable cause. Rather, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 contains a
"search and seizure" provision textually similar to the one in the
United States Constitution. 42 In recent years, Illinois courts have
construed this provision to provide more protection against such intru-
sions than has the United States Supreme Court.4 3 Thus, contrary to
Rice, federal "incorporation" of the Fourth Amendment as a limit on
state power is not germane to the substantive legal questions posed by
a comprehensive sweep of every apartment in a public housing project
in Illinois.44
By lamenting the police's inability to "respond to the demands of
residents and columnists" by conducting such sweeps, 4 5 Rice actually
42. The Illinois provision states that:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdrop-
ping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without probable
cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
43. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 155-56 (Ill. 1984) ("The intent of the [1970 Illi-
nois] constitutional convention was to extend the protection afforded by the
fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution and of our 1870 State Constitution
to cover eavesdropping and to protect against invasions of privacy." (citing 7 RE-
CORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2683
(1970))). Members of the Illinois Supreme Court have expressed pride in the
court's history of preceding the United States Supreme Court in recognizing cer-
tain rights as fundamental. One member of the court stated that:
During the era of the Warren court, this country saw a wave of judicial
activism in the Federal judiciary largely because State courts, particu-
larly in the Deep South, were unwilling to provide the most basic protec-
tions to citizens of their State. During the era of the Burger court, we
have seen the role of the State and Federal judiciary reversed. Today,
the United States Supreme Court has been cutting back on the individ-
ual liberties provided by the Warren court, while State supreme courts
have attempted to protect civil liberties in State constitutions. This tra-
dition of judicial independence has a long history in Illinois. This is a
court that.., adopted the exclusionary rule decades before the United
States Supreme Court held this rule applicable to the States.
Id. at 164 (Clark, J., specially concurring) (citations omitted).
44. Indeed, when this issue was finally decided in federal district court in Chicago,
the court noted that the proposed searches were illegal under both the Federal
and Illinois Constitutions. Pratt v. Chicago Housing Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 795
n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that the Illinois Constitution's search and seizure
"provision has been held to be coextensive with the scope of the constitutional
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . . [Therefore,] the CHA's
Search Policy also violates Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution" (citing People
v. Reincke, 405 N.E.2d 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Estrada, 386 N.E.2d 128
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979))).
45. Rice, supra note 40.
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finds fault with the substance of the "search and seizure" provisions in
the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Implicitly, he also criti-
cizes the very idea of limited constitutional government, which, by set-
ting limits on government power, necessarily disables government
from effectively responding to some perceived needs of its citizens. 4 6
Neither of these criticisms, however, would be addressed by repeal of
the "incorporation" doctrine. 4 7 With or without "incorporation," Chi-
cago police would still need probable cause to believe that illegal
weapons were present in a particular apartment in order to search
that apartment.
This example is not atypical. Critics such as Rice may not agree
with the Supreme Court's decisions in certain constitutional cases.
But if the same decisions would have been reached under state consti-
tutional law, then "incorporation" is the wrong target.
III. STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR
Most of the rights protected by the American State (and Federal)
Constitutions have their origins in English common law.48 Despite
the lack of written guarantees, these rights were generally protected
in the colonies even before independence from England was de-
clared. 49 In 1776, after declaring independence, several states
"adopted written constitutions to provide for permanent state govern-
ments and.., secure the inherent rights of the people as the basis of
46. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2093, 2103 n.34 (2002) ("Constitutions are supposed to incapacitate
government in certain ways. For example, the First Amendment is intended to
render Congress incapable of curtailing free speech, and the separation of powers
is supposed to make the president less capable of engaging in foreign
adventurism.").
47. Perhaps Professor Rice means to imply that state constitutions would be more
easily amended than the United States Constitution. In Illinois, a state constitu-
tional amendment requires three-fifths votes in each legislative chamber, and
then a three-fifths vote of the electorate. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2. While this is
somewhat less than what is required for a federal constitutional amendment, it is
nonetheless significant that neither Illinois nor any other state has ever repealed
a "search and seizure" provision from its bill of rights. In fact, the Illinois Consti-
tution of 1970, ratified subsequent to all the pertinent Supreme Court decisions
on "probable cause," uses language more direct and specific than that of the
Fourth Amendment to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures by state officers. See supra note 42.
48. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); Ed-
ward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HARv. L. REV. 149 (1928).
49. LEVY, supra note 48, at 333-404.
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government."50 That year, Virginia was the first state to ratify a
"Declaration of Rights as a preface to [its] constitution."5 1
The Virginia Declaration of Rights was both visionary52 and influ-
ential.53 Nonetheless, it exhibited "a certain carelessness... , possi-
bly the result of haste."5 4 For instance, the Declaration "inexplicably
omitted the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition; the right to
the writ of habeas corpus; grand jury proceedings; the right to counsel;
and freedom from double jeopardy as well as from attainders and ex
post facto laws,"55 despite the fact that all these rights were protected
under English law and Virginia common law. Indeed, "[tihe rights
omitted were as important and nearly as numerous as those included,
making the great Virginia Declaration of Rights appear to be an er-
ratic document compiled in slipshod fashion."56
This "slipshod" approach to drafting was imitated by the eleven
other states that ratified state constitutions before the United States
Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791.57 Four of these states did not in-
clude separate bills of rights in their constitutions,5 8 though the New
York and New Jersey Constitutions contained "omnibus clauses" that
50. Id. at 405.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 407 ("The Declaration, taken as a whole, reflected stylistic elegance, a
philosophic cast of mind, and a knowledge of English constitutional law and
American experience. Mason's draft of the Declaration, done entirely alone, was
far more comprehensive than the British precedents, such as the Petition of Right
and the [English] Bill of Rights.").
53. As George Mason, the author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, noted two
years later: "This was the first thing of the kind upon the continent, and has been
closely imitated by all the States." Letter from George Mason to Colonel George
Mercer (Oct. 2, 1778), in 1 KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON
1725-1792, at 237 (1892). The Declaration continued to be imitated by states
drafting constitutions until 1791, when it influenced the Federal Bill of Rights,
which was principally written by Virginian James Madison. See LEVY, supra note
48, at 409-10 (noting that the Virginia Declaration of Rights was imitated by
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
and North Carolina, and that its publication in the Philadelphia newspapers dur-
ing the Second Continental Congress insured its availability to all the delegates
in attendance).
54. LEVY, supra note 48, at 407.
55. Id. at 408.
56. Id.
57. Connecticut and Rhode Island did not ratify state constitutions until 1818 and
1842, respectively. THE STATE CONSTITUTrIONS 237 n.*, 1203 n.* (Charles Ket-
tleborough ed., 1918). These two states "stood pat with their old colonial char-
ters" until well after the United States Constitution was ratified. LEVY, supra
note 48, at 409. Vermont, however, which did not join the Union until 1791, did
ratify a state constitution, which included a Virginia-inspired bill of rights, in
1776. Id.
58. These four states were New Jersey, New York, Georgia, and South Carolina.
LEVY, supra note 48, at 410.
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kept the common law of England in force.59 Overall, there was no con-
sistent relationship between enumeration of a particular right in state
constitutions and protection of those rights under state law.60 Legal
historian Leonard Levy has described the situation:
The history of the writing of the first American bills of rights and constitu-
tions simply does not bear out the presupposition that the process was a dili-
gent or systematic one. Those documents, which we uncritically exalt, were
imitative, deficient, and irrationally selective. In the glorious act of framing a
social compact expressive of the supreme law, Americans tended simply to
draw up a random catalogue of rights that seemed to satisfy their urge for a
statement of first principles-or for some of them. That task was executed in
a disordered fashion that verged on ineptness. The inclusion or exclusion of
any particular right neither proved nor disproved its existence in a state's
colonial history.
6 1
By 1791, when the United States Bill of Rights was framed and
ratified, only two rights were textually secured in the constitutions of
all twelve62 state constitutions: trial by jury in criminal cases and free
exercise of religion. 63 As for the other rights appearing in the text of
the United States Bill of Rights:
Two states passed over a free press guarantee. Four neglected to ban exces-
sive fines, excessive bail, compulsory self-incrimination, and general search
warrants. Five ignored protections for the rights of assembly, petition, coun-
sel, and trial by jury in civil cases. Seven omitted a prohibition on ex post
facto laws, and eight skipped over the vital writ of habeas corpus. Nine failed
to provide for grand jury proceedings and to condemn bills of attainder. Ten
said nothing about freedom of speech, while eleven-all but New Hamp-
shire-were silent on the matter of double jeopardy.6 4
Between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, the states did
vary somewhat in the nature and degree of their protection of individ-
ual rights. 65 Similarly, there was variation between state and federal
protections of such rights.66 However, the differences, in practice,
59. Id. at 410. These "omnibus clauses" have also been termed "terse bill[s] of rights
because so many constitutional rights were" protected in the common law. Id.
New York ratified a "full" bill of rights as part of its constitution of 1821, and New
Jersey did so as part of its constitution of 1844.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 411.
62. Rhode Island and Connecticut had not yet ratified state constitutions in 1791,
though the newly admitted Vermont did have a constitution and bill of rights. See
supra note 57.
63. LEVY, supra note 48, at 412.
64. Id.
65. For example, five states "constitutionally permitted or [approved] an establish-
ment of religion in the form of tax supports for churches," while all the other
states prohibited such establishments. Id.
66. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833). In
Barron, municipal "improvements" to Baltimore's Inner Harbor substantially
submerged Barron's waterfront property. Barron sued the city for compensation,
citing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In denying Barron's claim,
the United States Supreme Court held that the protections of the Federal Bill of
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were never as great as comparison of the texts of the various constitu-
tions would suggest.
Further, state constitutions are amended or superseded far more
frequently than the United States Constitution.67 In the twenty-first
century, only New Hampshire (1784) and Vermont (1793) continue to
operate under eighteenth century constitutions, and both of those con-
stitutions have been amended far more than the United States Consti-
tution. Eight other states are operating under pre-Civil War
constitutions, 68 and one state still operates under a constitution
drafted and ratified during the Civil War.69 Thirty-nine states oper-
ate under constitutions drafted and ratified after the ratification of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Those thirty-
nine state constitutions, like the eleven pre-Fourteenth Amendment
constitutions, have generally been amended more easily and more fre-
quently than the United States Constitution.
Thus, the variation between the states regarding protection of indi-
vidual rights: (1) should not be overstated; and (2) has generally di-
minished over time. As demonstrated in Part III, the Supreme Court
has elected to "incorporate" only those rights which the states over-
whelmingly agree should be protected, and only at such times when a
universal trend toward recognition can be discerned.
IV. STATE ANALOGUES OF THE RIGHTS THAT HAVE
BEEN INCORPORATED
In this Part, the facts and holdings of the state court cases that
gave rise to the Supreme Court's criminal procedure "incorporation"
decisions are reviewed. To evaluate the practical impact of "incorpora-
tion" on criminal procedure in the states that were subject to "incorpo-
ration" decisions, specific points of disagreement between the state
courts and the United States Supreme Court are identified. Contrary
Rights did not limit state power. In dicta, however, the Court suggested that,
had it been the federal government rather than the state (acting through the city)
that had destroyed Barron's property, then Barron's claim would have prevailed
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 250.
67. See Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions
As An Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1852-54
(2004) (discussing frequency and relative ease of amending state constitutions).
68. These states are Indiana (1851), Iowa (1857), Kansas (1859), Maine (1819), Min-
nesota (1857), Ohio (1851), Oregon (1859), and Wisconsin (1848). Of these eight
states, all but Maine were federal territories prior to achieving statehood. Thus,
citizens of these states were accustomed to the protections of the Federal Bill of
Rights, and, not surprisingly, largely echoed them when drafting and ratifying
their own constitutions.
69. Nevada was organized as a United States Territory on March 2, 1861. Its consti-
tution was drafted by a convention held at Carson City during July, 1864, and




to common expectations, these points of disagreement are often nar-
row and technical, and occasionally inadvertent. In none of these deci-
sions did any state court declare that its state constitution did not
protect a right enumerated in the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment.
Immediately following the analysis of each "incorporation" case,
the law of every state whose constitution lacks an express analogue to
the "incorporated" United States constitutional provisions is surveyed.
These surveys demonstrate that the failure of a state constitution to
include particular constitutional language virtually never resulted in
any substantive difference in the level of protection afforded to crimi-
nal suspects or defendants under state criminal processes.
In several "incorporation" cases involving African-American crimi-
nal defendants, southern state courts had seemingly departed from, or
wholly ignored, the settled law of their own states.70 Perhaps para-
doxically, the United States Supreme Court's decisions in such cases
also did not alter the substantive contours of state criminal procedure
law. Instead, by requiring states to extend the same criminal proce-
dure protections to members of racial minorities as to the white major-
ity, these "incorporation" cases were functionally equivalent to "equal
protection" cases. In a companion article in which these cases are
closely analyzed, 7 1 the present Author hopes to explore the alignment
between the "doctrine of incorporation" and the antidiscrimination
principle that has been said to be the "core" Fourteenth Amendment
value.7 2 Accordingly, discussion of these particular "incorporation"
cases is beyond the scope of the present Article.
70. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (incorporating Sixth Amend-
ment right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
222-23 (1967) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to con-
front hostile witnesses); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (incorporating
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in capital cases). The defendant in Klopfer
was not African-American, but instead was a white college professor who had
organized racially integrated lunch counter sit-ins in North Carolina in the early
1960s.
71. Kenneth D. Katkin, Incorporation As Equal Protection, -L. Rev. - (forthcoming
2006).
72. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Proce-
dure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 48-49 (2000) ("[Tlhe linkage between the birth of mod-
ern criminal procedure and southern black defendants is no fortuity. For the
Court to assume the function of superintending the state criminal process re-
quired a departure from a century and a half of tradition and legal precedent,
both grounded in federalism concerns. .. . [Tihe Court was willing to take this
leap only when confronted with cases in which defendants were brutally tortured
into confessing or the appointment of defense counsel in a capital case was a com-
plete sham.").
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A. Searches and Seizures/Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 7 3 In the early twentieth century, these
rights were also guaranteed by the constitution of every state, though
the wording of the guarantee diverged in some states from that of the
Fourth Amendment. 7 4 In general, the scope of state protection pur-
ported to be at least as broad as in the United States Constitution,
although the Oklahoma Constitution expressly excepted corporations
from the protection against searches and seizures guaranteed to indi-
viduals,75 and Virginia courts had construed their state constitution
to permit warrantless searches. 76
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."); MD. CONST. dec. of rts.
art. 26 ("That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected
places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all
general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons,
without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and
ought not to be granted."); N.C. CONST. of 1876, art. I, § 15 (codified at N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 20) ("General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the act committed, or
to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly de-
scribed and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be
granted."); accord VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 11; see also VA. CONST. of 1902, art. I, § 10
(codified at VA. CONST. art. I, § 10) (discussed infra note 76); WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 7 (containing identical language to that of the Arizona Constitution).
75. Although article II, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution mirrors the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment, article II, section 28 of that same constitution
provides: "The records, books, and files of all corporations shall be, at all times,
liable and subject to the full visitorial and inquisitorial powers of the State, not-
withstanding the immunities and privileges in this Bill of Rights secured to the
persons, inhabitants, and citizens thereof." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 28.
76. The Virginia Constitution of 1902 provided: "That general warrants, whereby an
officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evi-
dence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and
oppressive, and ought not to be granted." VA. CONST. of 1902, art. I, § 10 (codified
at VA. CONST. art. I, § 10). Virginia courts construed this provision only as a
check against "general warrants," but not as a check against warrantless
searches. McClannan v. Chaplain, 116 S.E. 495, 498-99 (Va. 1923) (holding that
article I, section 10 of the Virginia Constitution is not directly applicable to a
search without any warrant). Even in so doing, however, Virginia courts pur-
ported to follow then-prevailing federal court interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 499 (holding that a warrantless search is per se "reasona-
ble" if contraband is discovered (citing Elrod v. Moss, 278 F. 123 (4th Cir. 1921))).
Though the Maryland, Vermont, and North Carolina guarantees against ille-
gal searches and seizures were worded similarly to the Virginia provision, none of
these states adopted interpretations as restrictive as Virginia's. See, e.g., Bass v.
State, 35 A.2d 155, 157, 159-60 (Md. 1943) (construing Maryland constitutional
provision in pari materia with Fourth Amendment, and holding that warrantless
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In 1949, when the Supreme Court "incorporated" the Fourth
Amendment's search and seizure provisions against the states in Wolf
v. Colorado,77 the Colorado Constitution of 1876 contained a provision
that was substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment. Then and
today, Colorado's provision guaranteed
[tihat the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place
or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be
searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, reduced to writing.78
At issue in Wolf was a warrantless seizure of medical records kept by
a surgeon who was suspected of having performed criminal abor-
tions. 7 9 Applying its state constitutional provision, the Colorado Su-
preme Court in Wolf assumed arguendo that the warrantless seizure
of the medical records had been unreasonable and had violated the
state constitution.8 0 Nonetheless, the state court sustained the pros-
ecution's introduction at trial of the unlawfully seized medical records,
and, accordingly, affirmed the surgeon's criminal conviction.8 1
The Colorado Supreme Court's disposition in Wolf was not anoma-
lous. While the fifty states have long been in virtually unanimous
agreement that people should be protected against warrantless
searches and seizures not based on probable cause, there was substan-
tial disagreement throughout the first half of the twentieth century
about what a court should do when it found that an unconstitutional
search or seizure had occurred. In particular, the exclusionary rule,
which requires exclusion from judicial proceedings of evidence ob-
tained in violation of a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, was highly controver-
sial.8 2 In 1914, a unanimous Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
search is reasonable only when an officer witnesses a crime and makes a search
incident to a lawful arrest and is lawfully present at the time); see also Blum v.
State, 51 A. 26, 29 (Md. 1902) (holding the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in part
material with the Maryland constitutional provision and that the evidence gained
as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure should not have been admit-
ted); State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097, 1098-99 (Vt. 1901) (holding that Vermont con-
stitutional provision protected a person from the use of a letter found on the
person when the warrant was for the recovery of stolen property).
77. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
78. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
79. Wolf v. State, 187 P.2d 926, 927 (Colo. 1947), affd, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 927-28.
82. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29 ("The contrariety of views of the States is particularly
impressive . . . ."). The leading opponent of the exclusionary rule was Justice
Cardozo during his tenure on the New York Court of Appeals. See People v. De-
fore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) ("There has been no blinking the conse-
quences. The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."), cert.
denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926). Arguing vigorously for the exclusionary rule was the
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States adopted the exclusionary rule as a "bright line" remedy for vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.8 3 Though the holding in Weeks applied only to federal
courts, a few states had already adopted similar rules.8 4 Following
Weeks, seventeen more states joined the federal courts in adopting the
exclusionary rule, while a narrow majority of states continued to re-
ject it.85
Michigan Supreme Court. See People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 557, 559 (Mich.
1919) ("That 'the end justifies the means' is a doctrine which has not found lodg-
ment in the archives of this court.").
83. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ("If letters and private docu-
ments can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and.., might as well be
stricken from the Constitution."). The exclusionary rule was anticipated as early
as Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which held that compulsory pro-
duction of business records violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and such
records were therefore inadmissible.
84. See, e.g., Hammock v. State, 58 S.E. 66, 67 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907), overruled by Cal-
houn v. State, 87 S.E. 893 (Ga. 1916); State v. Height, 91 N.W. 935, 940 (Iowa
1902); Blum v. State, 51 A. 26, 29-30 (Md. 1902); State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097,
1099 (Vt. 1901). In Wolf, the Supreme Court stated that only Iowa had adopted
the exclusionary rule prior to Weeks. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29, 34 & tbl.B (citing State
v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903)). The Court in Wolf cited cases from Mary-
land and Vermont as part of a list of twenty-six states that had considered and
rejected adopting the exclusionary rule before 1914. Id. at 29, 33-34 & tbl.A (cit-
ing Lawrence v. State, 63 A. 96, 103 (Md. 1906); State v. Mathers, 23 A. 590 (Vt.
1892)). In fact, Vermont courts appear to have pursued inconsistent courses with
respect to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 348-50 (Vt.
1982) (reviewing long inconsistent history of exclusionary rule in Vermont, and
reaffirming that Vermont Constitution requires exclusionary rule).
85. In 1923, Chief Justice John D. Carroll of the Kentucky Court of Appeals pub-
lished an influential article urging more states to adopt the exclusionary rule.
John D. Carroll, The Search and Seizure Provisions of the State and Federal Con-
stitutions, 10 VA. L. REV. 124 (1923). At that time, the exclusionary rule had been
adopted by the federal courts and the courts of eleven states including Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, South Carolina, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Evi-
dence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 10 VA. L. REV. 154, 155 (1923)
(citing cases). Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Delaware had not yet had occa-
sion to consider adopting the exclusionary rule, while every other state had re-
jected it. Id. By the end of the 1920s, the exclusionary rule had been adopted by
courts in ten additional states, beyond the eleven cited in the 1923 Virginia Law
Review note. See Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329, 331-32 (Fla. 1922); State v. Ar-
regui, 254 P. 788, 796 (Idaho 1927); People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112, 117 (Ill.
1924); State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100, 103 (Mo. 1924); State ex rel. King v. Dist.
Court, 224 P. 862, 865 (Mont. 1924); Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 550-51 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1923); State v. Gooder, 234 N.W. 610, 613 (S.D. 1930); Hughes v.
State, 238 S.W. 588, 594 (Tenn. 1922); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390, 396 (Wash.
1922); Hoyer v. State, 193 N.W. 89, 92 (Wis. 1923). One of these decisions,
Gooder, was overturned by the state legislature. 1939 S.D. LAws § 34.1102
(amending 1919 S.D. LAws § 4606) (all evidence admissible under a valid search
warrant is admissible notwithstanding defects in the issuance of the warrant).
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Between 1930 and 1949, the states continued to refine, and some-
times reverse, their positions on the exclusionary rule. By 1949, when
Wolf was decided, seventeen states had adopted and maintained the
exclusionary rule,8 6 twenty-seven states had consistently rejected it,87
three states had adopted and later abandoned it,88 and one state had
yet to pass on it.89
In Wolf, the United States Supreme Court purported to "incorpo-
rate" the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment, but
expressly refrained from incorporating the exclusionary rule rem-
edy.9 0 Both the Wolf Court's analysis and its holding were identical to
that of the Colorado Supreme Court, which it affirmed.9 1 Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Wolf was not inconsis-
tent with the substantive search and seizure law of any state, as it
then stood.
Following Wolf, four more states adopted the exclusionary rule,9 2
and Hawaii and Alaska, which achieved statehood in 1959, both pre-
As of 1930, twenty-five of the forty-eight states had not adopted the exclusionary
rule.
86. These states were Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29 & 38 tbl.I(b).
87. These states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
Id. at 29 & 38 tbl.I(a).
88. These states were Maryland, South Carolina, and Vermont. See Meisinger v.
State, 141 A. 536, 537-38 with dissenting opinion at 142 A. 190 (Md. 1928) (de-
clining to adopt exclusionary rule), overruled by Bouse Act, ch. 194 (1929) (codi-
fied at MD. CODE ANN., art. 35, § 5 (1947 Supp.) (repealed 1973)) (in trial of
misdemeanors, evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is inadmissible).
The history of the exclusionary rule in Maryland is discussed in Chu v. Anne
Arundel County, 537 A.2d 250, 252 (Md. 1988); see also Town of Blacksburg v.
Beam, 88 S.E. 441, 441 (S.C. 1916) (granting a motion to return illegally seized
property); but cf State v. Green, 114 S.E. 317, 319 (S.C. 1922) (rejecting exclu-
sionary rule); State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097, 1099 (Vt. 1901) (adopting exclusionary
rule); State v. Stacy, 160 A. 257, 266 (Vt. 1932) (rejecting exclusionary rule).
89. This state was Rhode Island. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 34 tbl.C.
90. Id. at 33.
91. Wolf v. State, 187 P.2d 926 (Colo. 1947) (interpreting search and seizure provi-
sions of article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution), affd, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
("incorporating" substantive search and seizure requirements of Fourth Amend-
ment, but not exclusionary rule remedy, against states).
92. Two state supreme courts adopted the exclusionary rule as a matter of state con-
stitutional common law. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (Cal. 1955), over-
ruling People v. Mayen, 205 P. 435 (Cal. 1922); Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199,
205 (Del. 1950), overruling State v. Chuchola, 120 A. 212 (Del. 1922). Two state
legislatures enacted the exclusionary rule. See State v. Mills, 98 S.E.2d 329, 335
(N.C. 1957) (sustaining the newly enacted section 15-27 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which requires the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence),
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served it. 93 By 1960, the United States Supreme Court counted
twenty-six states favoring the exclusionary rule, versus twenty-four
opposed.94
overruling State v. Simmons, 110 S.E. 591 (N.C. 1922); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-19-25
(1956) (requiring the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence).
93. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 tbl.I (1960) ("Alaska and Ha-
waii both hold illegally obtained evidence to be excludable, although it does not
appear that either has passed anew on this question since attaining statehood.").
As United States Territories, both states had been bound by the federal Bill of
Rights. After attaining statehood, both states retained the exclusionary rule
under their own state constitutions. See State v. Bonnell, 856 P.2d 1265, 1273
(Haw. 1993) ("A search is not made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or
bad when it starts and does not change character from its success .... [Elvidence
obtained as a result [of an unconstitutional search] . . . must be suppressed as
'fruits of the poisonous tree.'" (citing State v. Phillips 696 P.2d 346, 351 (1985))
(internal citations, punctuation marks omitted)); Anchorage Police Dep't Employ-
ees Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001) ("Alaska's
search and seizure clause is stronger than the federal protection because [Alaska
Const.] article I, section 14 is textually broader than the Fourth Amendment, and
the clause draws added strength from Alaska's express guarantee of privacy.")
(footnote omitted); see also Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716, 718 & n.6 (Alaska 1963)
("After statehood Alaska would have been free to retain the federal exclusionary
rule or to [reject it] except for the fact that in 1961 the Supreme Court saw fit in
Mapp v. Ohio to abandon the rule laid down in the Wolf case and to announce
[the federal exclusionary] rule .... [Had Alaska remained free to choose,] [tihe
reiteration in our state constitution of the principles expressed in the fourth
amendment would undoubtedly have weighed heavily in favor of Alaska abiding
by the federal exclusionary rule." (discussing ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 14)).
94. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 224-25 tbl.I. The court in Elkins may have exaggerated
this total somewhat. It included Alabama, Maryland, Michigan, and South Da-
kota in its count, even though each of these states had only adopted the exclu-
sionary rule for limited purposes. While an Alabama statute, ALA. CODE 29,
§ 210 (Supp. 1955), required the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in the
trial of certain alcohol control cases, the Alabama Supreme Court continued to
reject the exclusionary rule in other contexts. See, e.g., Oldham v. State, 67 So.
2d 55, 55 (Ala. 1953). Similarly, while a Maryland statute, the Bouse Act, MD.
CODE ANN. 35, § 5 (1951), required the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in
the trial of most misdemeanors, the Maryland Supreme Court continued to reject
the exclusionary rule in the trials of narcotics cases. See, e.g., Stevens v. State,
95 A.2d 877, 878 (Md. 1953). While the Michigan Supreme Court had at one time
adopted the exclusionary rule in full, People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 557, 559
(Mich. 1919); People v. Effelberg, 190 N.W. 727, 729 (Mich. 1922), the voters of
Michigan ratified a state constitutional amendment in 1952 stating that the state
constitution "shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceed-
ing any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon,
seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state."
MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. II, § 10 (amended 1952); see also People v. Gonzales,
97 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. 1959) (discussing 1952 Amendment). After the exclusionary
rule was "incorporated" against the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
Michigan's 1952 amendment was subsequently held to conflict with the United
States Constitution. See Lucas v. People, 420 F.2d 259, 262-63 (6th Cir. 1970);
People v. Pennington, 178 N.W.2d 460, 475-76 (Mich. 1970). Similarly, while the
South Dakota Supreme Court had at one time adopted the exclusionary rule in
full, State v. Gooder, 234 N.W. 610, 613 (S.D. 1930), the state legislature overrode
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A year after compiling this count, and twelve years after deciding
Wolf, the Supreme Court "incorporated" the exclusionary rule in Mapp
v. Ohio.9 5 The Mapp case concerned a state obscenity conviction that,
in the words of the Ohio Supreme Court, "was based primarily upon
the introduction in evidence of books and pictures unlawfully seized
during an unlawful search of defendant's home."9 6 Specifically, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the search and seizure of these items
violated the Ohio Constitution of 1851, which, like the Fourth Amend-
ment, guarantees that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and pos-
sessions against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person and
things to be seized.
9 7
Nonetheless, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, noting
that Ohio had not adopted the exclusionary rule under its own consti-
tution, and that the Supreme Court had not "incorporated" the rule
against the states.98
this decision. S.D. CODE § 34.1102 (1939); see also State v. Lane, 82 N.W.2d 286,
289 (S.D. 1957) (holding that the state legislature had the authority to override
the judicially adopted exclusionary rule).
In a classic case of the glass being half-empty to some while half-full to others,
Wolf in 1949 and Elkins in 1960 drew opposite conclusions about Maryland and
South Dakota from identical information. For a survey of the conflicting state
rules in the mid-1950s governing the admissibility, at the trial of a criminal case,
of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, see E.H. Schopler, Annota-
tion, Modern Status of Rule Governing Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Un-
lawful Search and Seizure, 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
95. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
96. State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ohio 1960), rev'd, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
97. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14 (discussed in Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 389). This "search
and seizure" provision of the Ohio Constitution remains unamended to this day.
98. See Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 389 ("[Tlhis court has held that evidence obtained by an
unlawful search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution ... and the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Constitution of the United
States does not usually prevent a state court from so holding." (citing Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); State v.
Lindway, 2 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio 1936))). In addition, a majority of the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Mapp also opined that the Ohio obscenity statute at issue in the
case violated federal First Amendment principles of freedom of speech and of the
press, which had already been "incorporated" against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 390-91. Nonetheless, while con-
stituting a simple majority, those Ohio Supreme Court Justices who believed that
the Ohio statute was unconstitutional were barred from so holding by a former
supermajority requirement in the Ohio Constitution which then provided: "No
law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the
concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of the
judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void."
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 (repealed 1968) (emphasis added); see also City of Euclid
v. Heaton, 238 N.E.2d 790, 795-97 (Ohio 1968) (discussing 1968 repeal of former
article IV, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution). On certiorari, the United States
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On certiorari in Mapp, the United States Supreme Court "incorpo-
rated" the exclusionary rule and reversed the defendant's underlying
Ohio obscenity conviction. 9 9 In doing so, the Mapp Court cited the
general trend among states since Wolf towards adopting the exclusion-
ary rule in whole or in part.loo In addition, the Court concluded, after
reviewing state cases, that "other remedies [for vindicating Fourth
Amendment rights] have been worthless and futile .... ,11o
The Wolf case, which "incorporated" the Fourth Amendment but
not the exclusionary rule, was so well received that no state rebelled
against it, several were sufficiently influenced by it to voluntarily
adapt their law to conform with federal interpretations (including the
exclusionary rule),1° 2 and the Supreme Court was encouraged to ex-
tend its holding in a subsequent line of cases.' 0 3 The Mapp decision,
on the other hand, which required twenty-four to twenty-eight states
to adopt the exclusionary rule against their wishes,10 4 was one of the
most poorly received of the "incorporation" cases. President Nixon ac-
Supreme Court addressed only the "search and seizure" issue, and did not take
up the "free speech" issue. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
99. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 (holding that "the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredi-
ent of the Fourth Amendment as the right it embodies is vouchsafed against the
States by the Due Process Clause"); The Mapp Court also stated:
Today we... close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, re-
served to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same un-
lawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inad-
missible in a state court.
Id. at 654-55.
100. Id. at 651 ("While in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the States
were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf case, more
than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial deci-
sion, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule." (citing Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960))).
101. Id. at 652.
102. See supra notes 92-94.
103. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208 (discarding the 'silver platter' doctrine which allowed fed-
eral judicial use of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution by state
agents); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960) (extending standing
to invoke exclusionary rule to anyone legitimately on the premises unlawfully
searched); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1956) (disallowing state
use of evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal agents); Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954).
104. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
20051
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:397
tively campaigned against it, 105 and law enforcement officers and
many lawyers and legal scholars were similarly critical.106
In response to this wave of criticism, the Supreme Court in the
years following Mapp has carved out a large number of "good faith
exceptions" to the exclusionary rule, under which evidence that has
been obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment requirements may
nonetheless be introduced in evidence in state criminal trials.107 At
the same time, the Court has repeatedly refused to apply the exclu-
sionary rule in state (or federal) judicial or administrative proceedings
other than criminal trials.108 Perhaps most significantly, the Su-
preme Court in 1976 ruled that "where the State has provided an op-
portunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a
105. In his acceptance speech at the 1968 Republican National Convention, candidate
Richard Nixon said that the Warren Court had gone too far in strengthening the
criminal forces against the "peace forces." Richard M. Nixon, Acceptance Speech,
in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 1928-1972, at
361 (Aaron Singer ed., 1976).
106. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the
Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1361, 1374 & nn.65-69 (2004) (discussing opposition to Mapp decision expressed
by police nationwide, the President of the American Bar Association, and many
legal scholars); see also Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W. VA.
L. REV. 771, 782 (1996) ("Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the states.., must rank among the most unpopular deci-
sions in Supreme Court history.") (footnotes omitted). But see Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1392-96 (1983) (defending the Mapp decision).
107. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (holding that evidence seized in
violation of Fourth Amendment as result of clerical errors of court employees is
admissible); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-44 (1988) (holding that
as long as a lawful seizure is independent from any observations or facts stem-
ming from an earlier, unlawful search and seizure, then the evidence gained from
the lawful seizure is admissible); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-55 (1987)
(holding that evidence obtained by an officer in "good faith" reliance upon an un-
constitutional state statute is admissible); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
921-25 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained by an officer in "good faith" reli-
ance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, but not based on
"probable cause," is admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-14
(1984) (holding that illegally-obtained evidence need not be excluded unless ille-
gal search and seizure is the "but for" cause of the discovery of the evidence).
108. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (holding that
exclusionary rule does not bar introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence in parole revocation hearing); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051
(1984) (holding that exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction of unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence in civil deportation proceedings); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (holding that exclusionary rule does not bar the
introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in federal civil tax proceed-
ings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-52 (1974) (holding that exclu-
sionary rule does not bar introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in
grand jury proceedings).
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state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial."109 By announcing numerous ex-
ceptions to Mapp's exclusionary rule while simultaneously cutting off
federal habeas corpus review of Mapps's application in state courts,
the Supreme Court effectively has overruled Mapp sub silentio, and
has reinstated the nonbinding framework of Fourth Amendment "in-
corporation" that had previously prevailed under Wolf.110 Under this
framework, state courts are admonished to conform to federal inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment, but, for all practical purposes,
are no longer required to adhere to such interpretations.11 Indeed,
some state courts have openly announced that Mapp is no longer bind-
ing on them.112
109. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (emphasis added).
110. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
111. Formally, state courts today remain subject to Mapp. As a practical matter, how-
ever, if a state court chooses to disregard the exclusionary rule in a criminal trial,
the only channel available through which an aggrieved defendant may seek relief
is to pursue discretionary certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court.
Such relief is rarely available, even in egregious cases of state court error. See,
e.g., Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982, 985 (2001) (Mem.) (Breyer, J., joined by Ste-
vens, J., O'Connor, J., and Souter, J., statement respecting the denial of the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari) (protesting, in vain, that "the city of Toledo clearly
violated the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Because the Court al-
ready has answered directly the basic legal question presented in this case, I
would not grant certiorari for the purpose of hearing that question argued once
again. I would, however, summarily reverse the decision below.").
In fact, in modem cases in which the United States Supreme Court has re-
viewed state court applications of the federal exclusionary rule, the Supreme
Court has been more likely than the state courts under review to hold that exclu-
sion of evidence was not required under Mapp. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Pa-
role, 524 U.S. at 369 (reversing a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that had
excluded from a parole revocation hearing evidence seized in violation of Fourth
Amendment); Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-16 (reversing Arizona Supreme Court deci-
sion that had excluded from a criminal trial certain evidence seized in violation of
Fourth Amendment as result of clerical errors of court employees). Even in cases
where the Supreme Court, on review, has found Fourth Amendment violations
that state courts did not find, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to require
exclusion of evidence as a remedy for such violations. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkan-
sas, 514 U.S. 927, 936-37 (1995) (reversing Arkansas Supreme Court in holding
that Fourth Amendment requires officers to knock and announce their presence
and authority before entering dwelling unless it is "reasonable" not to do so, but
remanding to state court to consider whether evidence would have to be excluded
if found to be unlawfully obtained); Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 83-85 (1994)
(reversing Nevada Supreme Court in holding that judicial probable cause deter-
mination must be made within 48 hours of warrantless arrest, but remanding to
state court to consider remedy while stating that defendant need not be set free).
112. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 655 N.W.2d 236, 239 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) ("Con-
trary to the constitutional premise of Mapp v. Ohio (EWe hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court.'), the United States Supreme Court has
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On the other hand, since Mapp, one state expressly constitutional-
ized the exclusionary rule,113 four states have amended the "search
and seizure" provisions of their constitutions to provide protection
against illegal wiretaps, electronic eavesdropping, or other innova-
tions,1 1 4 and ten states have constitutionalized the more general
"right to privacy" that Justice Brandeis originally argued was the ba-
sis of the exclusionary rule.115 These states, and a few others, have
mandated use of the exclusionary rule in cases in which the United
States Supreme Court would not have held that the Fourth Amend-
ment so required. 1 16
In sum, while Mapp had the potential to change the substantive
law of a number of states in the 1960s, the Supreme Court retreated
relatively quickly from its holding in that case. Today, the "incorpora-
tion" of the Fourth Amendment's "search and seizure" provisions
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment has little or no im-
pact, in practice, on the substantive law of state criminal procedure in
any of the fifty states. Rather, in virtually every situation in which
Fourth Amendment "incorporation" is applicable, each state willingly
protects the rights of its inhabitants at least as strongly as the Su-
preme Court has held that the "incorporated" Fourth Amendment
would require.
now determined that the use of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments does not violate the United States Constitution." (citing
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. at 362-63) (internal citations omitted).
113. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence .... .") (ratified in 1968). Florida's 1968 consti-
tution was subsequently amended in 1982 to state:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to
the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Su-
preme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would
be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court
construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. (amended 1982).
114. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable
searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by
eavesdropping devices or other means."); accord FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; HAw.
CONST. art. I, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
115. ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed."); accord ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7; ILL. CONST. art I, § 6; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art I, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7. The Alaska, California, Florida, and Montana privacy provi-
sions are self-contained, while those of Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, South Caro-
lina, and Washington are interwoven with their constitutional search and seizure
provisions. The Hawaii Constitution contains both types of provisions.
116. See generally Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 1279 (1992) (providing numerous examples).
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B. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that: "No person shall .. .be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb . ."ll7 The Clause has been held to
provide three separate constitutional protections. "It protects against
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."11s
In 1937, the Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticutl'9 initially de-
clined to "incorporate" the Double Jeopardy Clause as a limit on state
power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 120 In 1969, however, the
Court reversed course, "incorporating" the Clause in Benton v.
Maryland.12 1
Maryland, alone among the fifty states, never protected the right
against double jeopardy under its constitution or by statute. Nonethe-
less, the right of an individual to be tried no more than once for the
same crime was long recognized as a component of Maryland common
law. 122 As part of Maryland's common law, however, this right was
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). The
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar prosecutors from appealing dismissals of
criminal indictments, grants of new trials, or grants of defendants' motions to
suppress evidence. See Criminal Appeals Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2000 &
Supp. II 2002) (authorizing such appeals); see also United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980) ("[Where the trial has been terminated prior to a jury
verdict at the defendant's request on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence, the
Government may seek appellate review of that decision even though a second
trial would be necessitated by a reversal."). For a survey of the history of federal
Criminal Appeals Acts, see generally United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
336-39 (1975).
119. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
120. Id. at 328.
121. 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
122. See, e.g., Bennington v. Warden of Md. House of Corr., 59 A.2d 779, 780 (Md.
1948) ("The rule against double jeopardy contained in the 5th Amendment ... is
not set out in the Maryland Constitution but is applied in this State as a doctrine
of the common law." (citing Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 425 (1863))); Gilpin v. State,
121 A. 354, 355 (Md. 1923) ("That no person shall for the same offense be twice
put in jeopardy is both a provision of the Constitution of the United States
(Amendment 5), and an established rule of the common law, and a plea of former
jeopardy is good under either."); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878). The court in
Shields explained:
It has always been a settled rule of the common law that after an acquit-
tal of a party upon a regular trial on an indictment for either a felony or
a misdemeanor, the verdict of acquittal can never afterward, on the ap-
plication of the prosecutor, in any form of proceeding, be set aside and a
new trial granted, and it matters not whether such verdict be the result
of a misdirection of the Judge on a question of law, or of a misconception
of fact on the part of the jury.
Id. at 303-04.
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subject to limitation by statute.12 3 In 1945, Maryland enacted a stat-
ute that authorized state prosecutors to appeal from acquittals in cer-
tain non-jury criminal cases. 124 Shortly thereafter, Maryland's
highest court held that this statute validly abrogated Maryland's com-
mon law rule against double jeopardy.12 5
In upholding the 1945 statute against state and federal constitu-
tional challenge, the Maryland court acknowledged that the statute
would not pass muster under the federal courts' interpretation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.126 Citing Palko, however, the Maryland
court noted that federal interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
was not binding on Maryland courts via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 12 7 Thus, state appeals from non-jury criminal acquittals con-
tinued in Maryland until 1969, when Benton became the last case ever
to "incorporate" an enumerated right in the Bill of Rights as a limit on
state power.
The Benton case involved a defendant who was convicted of bur-
glary by a Maryland jury, but acquitted of a larceny charge brought in
the same case.128 Because avowed atheists had been unconstitution-
ally excluded from the grand jury that indicted the defendant, the in-
dictment was subsequently declared invalid, and the defendant's
burglary conviction was vacated. 129 Following the vacatur, the defen-
dant was reindicted by a different grand jury on the same burglary
and larceny charges, and retried before a different petit jury.130 On
retrial, the second jury convicted the defendant on both charges. 13 1
The trial court then sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in prison
123. See Robb v. State, 60 A.2d 211, 215 (Md. 1948) ("[T]he provision against double
jeopardy, being a common law rule, the Legislature... abrogated that rule so far
as it [enacted a] statute [that] gave the state the right of appeal from the Trial
Magistrate.").
124. Md. Acts of 1945, ch. 845, art. 52, § 13 ("If after a trial before the Trial Magistrate
either party shall feel aggrieved by his judgment there shall be a right of appeal
within ten days to the Circuit Court for the county in which the alleged offense is
charged to have been committed .... (quoted in Robb, 60 A.2d at 212)); see also
Robb, 60 A.2d. at 215 (discussing predecessor statutes dating back to 1914). In
practice, the Maryland statute at issue in Robb appears to have authorized the
prosecution to appeal from an acquittal entered by a trial magistrate judge fol-
lowing a bench trial, and to obtain a trial de novo in the Maryland Circuit Court.
Id. at 212.
125. Robb, 60 A.2d at 215.
126. See id. at 213.
127. Id. at 213 ("[G]iving the State the right to appeal from the Trial Magistrate to the
Circuit Court is not a violation of the Federal Constitution . . . ." (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937))).
128. Benton v. State, 232 A.2d 541, 542 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967), vacated, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
129. Id. Cf Schowgurow v. State, 213 A.2d 475 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1965) (holding that
religious requirements for jury service are unconstitutional).
130. Benton, 232 A.2d at 542.
131. Id.
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on the burglary count, and five years on the larceny count, sentences
to run concurrently.1 32
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of his retrial on the
larceny charge, of which he had earlier been acquitted. 133 The Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals rejected this challenge, holding that
under Maryland law, "when a traverser has been tried on an indict-
ment or information that is invalid, he is not in jeopardy and he may
be indicted and tried again."134 In so holding, the Maryland court did
not assert that double jeopardy principles were irrelevant in Mary-
land. To the contrary, in holding that reindictment following vacatur
of an invalid indictment did not constitute double jeopardy, the Mary-
land court in Benton relied on-and purported to follow-two recent
precedents of the United States Supreme Court in which reindictment
of federal criminal defendants following vacatur of earlier indictments
had been sustained. 135 Accordingly, the United States Supreme
Court subsequently acknowledged that the Maryland court had ad-
dressed the defendant's double jeopardy claim, but had rejected it "on
the merits."13 6
On certiorari in Benton, the United States Supreme Court formally
overruled Palko,137 and held that "the double jeopardy prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitu-
tional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment."138 Applying federal double jeopardy stan-
dards, the Supreme Court concluded:
It is clear that petitioner's larceny conviction cannot stand once federal double
jeopardy standards are applied. Petitioner was acquitted of larceny in his
132. Id. In practice, the court's decision to impose concurrent sentences meant that
the conviction on the larceny count could not affect the amount of time in prison
the defendant would actually serve, except in the unlikely event that the bur-
glary count, but not the larceny count, was later vacated or reversed. See Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-91 (1969) (discussing whether there was a "live"
case or controversy, given the unlikelihood that the defendant's prison sentence
would be affected if the larceny conviction were vacated).
133. Benton, 232 A.2d at 542.
134. Id. at 543 (quoting Tate v. State, 203 A.2d 882, 884 (Md. 1964)) (citations
omitted).
135. Id. (upholding reindictment that contained additional charges, after earlier in-
dictment that had led to guilty plea was found invalid and conviction was va-
cated) (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1966); United States
v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1964) ("If a case is reversed because of ... a
deficiency in the indictment.., it is presumed that the accused did not have his
case fairly put to the jury," and that the defendant can be retried)). In neither of
the federal cases cited by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Benton, how-
ever, did the subsequent indictments sustained by the United States Supreme
Court contain any criminal charges of which the defendants at issue had already
been acquitted at trial.
136. Benton, 395 U.S. at 786.
137. Id. at 794.
138. Id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
first trial. Because he decided to appeal his burglary conviction, he is forced to
suffer retrial on the larceny count as well .... "[C]onditioning an appeal of
one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on an-
other offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy."1 3 9
In so holding, the Supreme Court did change the substantive law of
Maryland. Notably, however, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
in Benton squarely affirmed that criminal defendants in Maryland
possessed a right not to be placed in double jeopardy. Moreover, in
specifying the scope of this right, the Maryland court apparently at-
tempted to follow prevailing United States Supreme Court precedent,
while expressing no disagreement with federal doctrine. Had the Ma-
ryland court known that the federal Double Jeopardy Clause would be
construed to preclude reindictment of a defendant, following vacatur
of an invalid indictment, on charges of which the defendant was ac-
quitted, the Maryland court in Benton seemingly would have adopted
this federal construction voluntarily. If so, then binding "incorpora-
tion" of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Benton may not have altered
Maryland criminal procedure any more than a merely "persuasive"
federal interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause would have
done.
In addition to Maryland, the constitutions of Massachusetts, Ver-
mont, Connecticut, and North Carolina have also never contained ex-
press double jeopardy clauses. However, Massachusetts 140 and
139. Id. at 796 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1957)). The
Benton Court traced the lineage of the federal double jeopardy standard to United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 667-70 (1896), which held that the Government can-
not rely on its own error in issuing a defective indictment as a ground for over-
coming the defendant's protection against double jeopardy following acquittal by
a jury. See Benton, 395 U.S. at 797.
140. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 contained the first colonial legisla-
tive protection from double jeopardy: "No man shall be twise sentenced by Civill
Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or Trespasse." Mass. Body of Liber-
ties 42. Some version of this statute has remained in effect in Massachusetts
ever since. See MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 263, § 7 (West 2000) ("A person shall
not be held to answer on a second indictment or complaint for a crime of which he
has been acquitted upon the facts and merits; but he may plead such acquittal in
bar of any subsequent prosecution for the same crime, notwithstanding any de-
fect in the form or substance of the indictment or complaint on which he was
acquitted."). Massachusetts courts also have long protected criminal defendants
against retrial on charges of which the defendants have been previously con-
victed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCan, 178 N.E. 633, 634 (Mass. 1931) (the
principle "that, where one has been convicted and punished by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, all other proceedings for the same offence are barred to the end
that the defendant shall not be punished again for the same matter ... is jeal-
ously guarded as an important principle of individual safety and personal right"
in Massachusetts); accord Commonwealth v. Burke, 172 N.E.2d 605, 606 (Mass.
1961); Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 207 (1855); Common-
wealth v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496, 501 (1832).
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Vermont 14 ' have long protected individuals against double jeopardy
by statute, while Connecticut 142 and North Carolina14 3 have inter-
preted their constitutional guarantees of due process to include a
guarantee against double jeopardy. These four states, like Maryland,
have also generally adhered to federal interpretations of the definition
of double jeopardy.
141. Vermont's current double jeopardy statute provides:
A person shall not be held to answer on a second complaint, information
or indictment for an offense of which he was acquitted by a jury upon the
merits on a former trial. Such acquittal may be pleaded in bar of a sub-
sequent prosecution for the same offense, notwithstanding defects in the
form or substance of the complaint, information or indictment on which
he was acquitted.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6556 (1998). Predecessor statutes can be traced back to
at least 1857. See id. (legislative history annotation). Vermont courts also have
long protected criminal defendants against retrial on charges of which the de-
fendants have been previously convicted. See, e.g., State v. Locklin, 10 A. 464 (Vt.
1887) (dismissing indictment charging a breach of the peace, because the ele-
ments of the offense were subsumed within another offense for which the defen-
dant had already been convicted); see also State v. Deso, 1 A.2d 710, 715 (Vt.
1938) ("Where one offense is a necessary element in, and constitutes a part of,
another, and both are in fact but one transaction, an acquittal or conviction of one
is a bar to a prosecution for the other.") (citations omitted).
142. Kohlfuss v. Warden of Conn. State Prison, 183 A.2d 626, 627 (Conn. 1962) (al-
though "[t] here is no specific provision against double jeopardy in the constitution
of Connecticut," Connecticut courts "have in large part adopted the common-law
rule against it as necessary to the due process guaranteed by article first, § 9, of
[the Connecticut] constitution" (citing State v. Lee, 30 A. 1110 (Conn. 1894))),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962); accord State v. Laws, 655 A.2d 1131, 1139
(Conn. App. Ct. 1995), cert. denied, 659 A.2d 1210 (Conn. 1995); see also State v.
Carabetta, 137 A. 394 (Conn. 1927) (holding that after acquittal and discharge,
defendant's reapprehension on decision of prosecutor to appeal constituted
double jeopardy); State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414, 418 (1829) (assuming that
double jeopardy is unconstitutional in Connecticut); State v. Garvey, 42 Conn.
232, 233 (1875) (same).
143. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that:
It is a fundamental and sacred principle of the common law, deeply im-
bedded in our criminal jurisprudence, that no person can be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense. It was incorporated in the
Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. While the principle is not
stated in express terms in the North Carolina Constitution, it has been
regarded as an integral part of the "law of the land" within the meaning
of [the North Carolina Constitution].
State v. Crocker, 80 S.E.2d 243, 245 (N.C. 1954) (citing State v. Hicks, 64 S.E.2d
871 (N.C. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951); State v. Mansfield, 176 S.E.
761 (N.C. 1934); State v. Prince, 63 N.C. 529 (1869)); see also State v. Battle, 183
S.E.2d 641, 643 (N.C. 1971) ("The 'sacred principle of the common law' that no
person can twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense has always
been an integral part of the law of North Carolina. Therefore, the decision in
Benton v. Maryland, which made the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth
Amendment applicable to the several states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
added nothing to our law.") (citation omitted).
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However, before the Double Jeopardy Clause was "incorporated,"
Vermont and Connecticut, like Maryland, departed from federal prac-
tice in certain respects. Prior to "incorporation," Vermont sometimes
permitted prosecutors to reinstate criminal prosecutions they had pre-
viously instituted and then abandoned.144 While Vermont courts ap-
parently believed this practice to be inconsistent with federal double
jeopardy standards,145 in fact the federal constitutional doctrine of
"manifest necessity" also authorizes reinstatement of criminal
charges, in certain circumstances, following dismissal of a criminal
case. 14 6 In that regard, Vermont's "discontinuance" law may be func-
tionally equivalent, in many cases, to the federal doctrine of "manifest
necessity."
Connecticut went farther than Vermont by allowing the state, with
the permission of the trial judge, to appeal from acquittals following
jury trials.147 While acknowledging that the state constitution's due
process clause protected criminal defendants against double jeopardy,
144. See Deso, 1 A.2d at 715 (permitting reinstatement of charges after prosecutor's
prior abandonment of case before judgment). Such reinstatement was prohibited
in cases where it would likely prejudice the defendant. See id. ("The court, in
granting permission [for dismissed charges to be reinstated], will exercise its ju-
dicial discretion. If the case appear a clear one for the [defendant], the court will
not give the permission, as he is entitled to a verdict of acquittal. If the case
appear against the accused, he can have no objection to a nolle prosequi." (quot-
ing State v. Roe, 12 Vt. 93, 109 (1840))). Vermont's practice was shared by a few
states whose constitutions did contain express double jeopardy provisions. See,
e.g., State v. Brunn, 154 P.2d 826 (Wash. 1945).
145. See State v. Felch, 105 A. 23, 25-26 (Vt. 1918) (acknowledging that retrial follow-
ing dismissal of a criminal case would constitute double jeopardy under the Fifth
Amendment, but holding that "relief from the vexation of a second trial" is not a
fundamental right of United States citizenship protected against state abridg-
ment by the Fourteenth Amendment).
146. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (holding that charges may be
reinstated after trial judge, over defendant's objection but before evidence is
presented, declares mistrial based on defects in indictment); Thompson v. United
States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause not vio-
lated when jury is discharged after trial has begun and new trial is commenced
before another jury, where there is a "manifest necessity" to order new trial, such
that the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated). The doctrine of
"manifest necessity" is often traced to Justice Story's opinion for the Supreme
Court in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824), which held that a "hung"
jury's failure to agree on a verdict creates a "manifest necessity" for a trial judge
to declare a mistrial and order a new trial of the defendant, because "the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated." Id. at 579.
147. 1886 Conn. Pub. Acts 560 ("Appeals from the rulings and decisions of the superior
court or of any criminal court of common pleas, upon all questions of law arising
on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with the permission of
the presiding judge, to the supreme court of errors, in the same manner and to
the same effect as if made by the accused."), set forth in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 321 n.1 (1937) (currently codified as amended at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-96 (West 2001)).
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Connecticut courts held that prosecution appeals did not necessarily
constitute double jeopardy.148 In Palko, the United States Supreme
Court held that Connecticut's practice did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though the Fifth Amendment by then had been
held to bar prosecutors from appealing from acquittals in federal crim-
inal cases.14 9
In Palko, a Connecticut jury had convicted the defendant of second-
degree murder in a state criminal trial, but acquitted him on a concur-
rent charge of first-degree murder.150 Despite securing a second-de-
gree murder conviction that carried with it a life sentence, the state
prosecutors in Palko appealed the defendant's acquittal on the first-
degree murder charges.151 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors reversed the trial court's judgment of acquittal on the
first-degree murder charge, and ordered a new trial.152 At the new
trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, and sen-
tenced to death.153 The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors af-
firmed the conviction and death sentence.154 The defendant then
sought review in the United States Supreme Court, where he argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the protections of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and therefore barred the state from appeal-
ing a judgment of acquittal and subsequently retrying the defendant
on the same charge of which he had previously been acquitted.
148. State v. Lee, 30 A. 1110 (Conn. 1894). In Lee, The Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors followed then-current federal precedent, which held that the common law
prohibited appeals by the government absent express statutory authorization. See
United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892) ("[Ilt is settled by an over-
whelming weight of American authority, that the State has no right to sue out a
writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except
under and in accordance with express statutes .... .") (emphasis added).
149. The Supreme Court first held that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause barred the federal government from appealing an acquittal in a federal
criminal case in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126-33 (1904).
150. Palko, 302 U.S. at 321.
151. Id. On appeal, the state alleged that the trial judge had erred by excluding cer-
tain testimony from the trial, and by giving improper jury instructions as to the
difference between first and second degree murder. Id.
152. State v. Palko, 186 A. 657 (Conn. 1936).
153. Palko, 302 U.S. at 321-22.
154. 191 A. 320, af/d, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In so holding, the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors reaffirmed that double jeopardy was prohibited by the state con-
stitution, notwithstanding the lack of any express clause so providing. Id. at 325.
However, the court maintained that "permitting an appeal by the State" did not
constitute double jeopardy because:
[Tihere is but one jeopardy and one trial; that where material error is
committed on a trial and a new trial is ordered by the appellate court
upon the State's appeal, the second trial is not a new case but is a legal
disposal of the same original case tried in the first instance.
Id. (citing State v. Lee, 30 A. 1110 (Conn. 1894)).
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In a famous formulation of the doctrine of "selective incorporation,"
Justice Cardozo rejected the defendant's claim, writing for a unani-
mous Supreme Court in Palko that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not "incorporate" all the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.155
Instead, the Amendment "incorporates" only those rights that are "of
the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," such that "[tlo abolish
them is . . . to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'"156
Finding that no such fundamental principle barred retrial of a crimi-
nal case "until there shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substan-
tial legal error," the Palko court refused to "incorporate" the Double
Jeopardy Clause as a limit on state power.15 7
Thirty-two years later, in Bentonls8 the United States Supreme
Court overruled Palko and "incorporated" the Double Jeopardy Clause
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 159 None-
theless, despite Benton's overruling of Palko, the Connecticut statute
that was upheld in Palko remains in effect today.160 Furthermore,
though modern Connecticut courts have held that this statute must be
construed narrowly, 161 none, even after Benton, have considered strik-
155. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
156. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
157. Id. at 328. The Palko Court did, however, state in dicta that the Fourteenth
Amendment would bar retrial of defendants who had been acquitted in state
criminal cases where such retrial would subject such defendants to "a hardship so
acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it." Id.
158. See discussion supra notes 128-39.
159. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) ("The fundamental nature
of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted. Its origins can
be traced to Greek and Roman times, and it became established in the common
law of England long before this Nation's independence .... Like the right to trial
by jury, it is clearly 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice.'") (citations
omitted).
160. The current version provides:
Appeals from the rulings and decisions of the superior court, upon all
questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by
the state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme
court or to the appellate court, in the same manner and to the same ef-
fect as if made by the accused.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-96 (West 2001).
161. See, e.g., State v. Morrissette, 830 A.2d 704 (Conn. 2003) (construing statute not
to authorize prosecution appeal of trial court's grant of defendant's motion for
new trial); State v. Paolella, 554 A.2d 702 (Conn. 1989) (construing statute not to
authorize state appeals from acquittals in criminal cases, and holding that trial
court's dismissal of a sexual assault prosecution on ground that defendant was
legally married to complainant at time of alleged offense constituted a nonappeal-
able "acquittal"); State v. Falzone, 370 A.2d 988 (Conn. 1976) (holding right of
state to appeal in criminal cases is granted only by statute, and there is no com-
mon-law right of such appeal by the state); State v. Audet, 365 A.2d 1082, 1085
(Conn. 1976) (holding state may not appeal in criminal case without first ob-
taining the permission of the trial judge).
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ing it down as unconstitutional.162 Nor have any federal courts.
Thus, it appears that, at least with respect to the limitation of the
right of a state to appeal a criminal acquittal in Connecticut, the Fifth
Amendment right against double jeopardy has not been fully
"incorporated.'1 6 3
By imposing federal double jeopardy standards on the states, the
Supreme Court in Benton effected modest changes, in a handful of sit-
uations, to the substantive law of a few states. Even before Benton,
however, every state purported to protect criminal defendants against
double jeopardy. Moreover, other than some minor variation at the
margins, every state's definition of double jeopardy was substantially
similar to the federal definition. Even in cases where state double
jeopardy standards appear to have varied from federal standards (as
in Benton itself), such variation was as likely to be attributable to
state courts' failure to fully apprehend the federal doctrine as to state
courts' active disagreement with federal doctrine. Accordingly, the
"incorporation" of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy protections
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment has exerted only a
very modest impact, in practice, on the law of criminal procedure in a
handful of the fifty states.
C. Compelled Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."164 Since the earliest days of the Republic,
the constitutions of all but two states have always expressly protected
the right of individuals against compelled self-incrimination.1 65
162. See supra note 161; see also State v. Malcolm, 778 A.2d 134 (Conn. 2001) (holding
state could appeal trial court's ruling vacating conviction for sale of a controlled
substance and allowing defendant to withdraw guilty plea); State v. Anonymous,
739 A.2d 298 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (holding appellate court may review whether
trial court abused discretion in denying state permission to appeal question of
law in criminal cases); State v. Fuessenich, 717 A.2d 801 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)
(holding state could appeal adverse decision in probation revocation hearing pur-
suant to this statute), cert. denied, 723 A.2d 813 (Conn. 1999), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1004 (1999).
163. See James A. Strazzella, The Relationship of Double Jeopardy to Prosecution Ap-
peals, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 2 (1997) (asserting that an examination of case
law reveals "that double jeopardy law does not itself bar prosecution appeals,
despite frequent assertions to the contrary"); id. at 13-16 (surveying existing
state statutes, including Connecticut's, that permit prosecution appeals in state
criminal cases); cf Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 40 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(noting that not every aspect of the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy law is ap-
plicable to the states).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
165. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 2 (1955) ("Similar provi-
sions [to the Fifth Amendment's Compelled Self-Incrimination Clause] have long
been included in the constitutions of nearly every state. We are not dealing with
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Those two states, Iowa and New Jersey, both have long construed the
due process clauses of their respective state constitutions to protect
the privilege against self-incrimination.166
The Supreme Court "incorporated" the privilege against self-in-
crimination in Malloy v. Hogan,167 a case arising from Connecticut.
In Malloy, the defendant, William Malloy, had been convicted on mis-
demeanor state gambling charges. While still on probation from that
conviction, Malloy was subpoenaed to testify in a quasi-judicial special
inquiry before a commission investigating gambling and other crimi-
nal activities in Hartford County.16 8 There, Malloy was asked a num-
ber of questions related to persons and events surrounding his arrest
and conviction.16 9 When he refused to answer these questions "on the
ground that an answer would tend to incriminate him," the Superior
Court held him in contempt, and committed him to prison until he was
willing to answer the questions.170
On appeal from the denial of Malloy's petition for state habeas
corpus relief, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors recognized
that "[t]he law according the privilege against self-incrimination is not
either an alien or a novel doctrine."); see also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 586 (1892) (noting variations in state constitutional language, but conclud-
ing "there is really, in spirit and principle, no distinction arising out of such dif-
ference of language").
166. See, e.g., State v. Height, 91 N.W. 935, 936 (Iowa 1902) (holding that a defen-
dant's privilege against self-incrimination is "one of the protections afforded him
from time immemorial by rules of evidence so fully recognized and so fundamen-
tal with reference to criminal procedure that [to violate] it must be contrary to
due process of law"); accord State v. Sentner, 298 N.W. 813 (Iowa 1941); State v.
Dickson, 202 N.W. 225 (Iowa 1925); Wragg v. Griffin, 170 N.W. 400 (Iowa 1919);
see also State v. Fary, 117 A.2d 499, 501 (N.J. 1955) (Brennan, J.) (reviewing 150
years of New Jersey law, and concluding that New Jersey law always protected
the privilege against self-incrimination at least as vigorously as federal law).
Justice William Brennan's opinion for the New Jersey Supreme Court in Fary
greatly foreshadowed his later opinion for the United States Supreme Court "in-
corporating" the privilege against self-incrimination in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964)
167. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
168. Malloy v. Hogan, 187 A.2d 744, 745-46 (Conn. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
The inquiry was refereed by a former Chief Justice of Connecticut appointed to
his post by the Superior Court of Hartford County. Id. at 746.
169. The questions included the following:
(1) For whom did Malloy work on September 11, 1959, the date he was
arrested on the charge on which he was convicted? (2) Who selected and
paid his counsel in connection with that charge and his defense thereto?
(3) Who selected his bondsman and who paid him? (4) Who paid Malloy's
fine? (5) What was the name of the tenant in the apartment in which he
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open to question." 17 1 It further noted that the language of the Con-
necticut Constitution concerning compelled self-incrimination "is very
similar to that of the fifth amendment to the United States constitu-
tion, and cases interpreting the scope and application of the fifth
amendment in federal proceedings are not without persuasive force in
the interpretation of our own constitutional provision."172 Accord-
ingly, the Connecticut court concluded, "[iut is clear that Malloy was
clothed with this privilege when he went before the referee, so that the
only question is whether his refusal to answer was justified under the
rules governing the exercise of the privilege." 17 3 Relying heavily on
United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Fifth
Amendment, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in Malloy re-
cited the pertinent "rules governing the exercise of the privilege" as
follows:
A witness has the right to refuse to answer any question which would tend to
incriminate him. But a mere claim on his part that the evidence will tend to
incriminate him is not sufficient. [The question is] ... whether, from the cir-
cumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is
called upon to give, there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger of crimi-
nal liability from his being compelled to answer. That danger must be real
and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordi-
nary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial char-
acter, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible
contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influ-
ence his conduct. 1 7 4
Following recent federal precedent, the Connecticut court also
stated that "[wihere the state opposes a claim of privilege from self-
incrimination on the ground of immunity from possible punishment-
whether the immunity arises from a prior conviction, from the bar of a
statute of limitations, from a pardon, or from any other cause-the
state has the burden of proving the adequacy of the protection afforded
by the immunity claimed."17 5 On the facts before it, however, the
Connecticut court found that the state had carried this burden. First,
the court noted that Malloy faced no continuing jeopardy on the gam-
171. Id.; see also id. at 746-47 ("Our decisions from a time antedating the adoption of
our constitution in 1818 have consistently recognized and upheld the privilege
.... (citing Grannis v. Branden, 5 Day 260, 272 (Conn. 1812); Town of Norfolk v.
Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309, 312 (1859))).
172. Id. at 747 (citing cases); see also CONN. CONST. art I, § 8 ("No person shall be
compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law . . . .") (codified at time of Malloy case at CONN.
CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9).
173. Malloy, 187 A.2d at 747.
174. Id. (internal citations and punctuation marks omitted) (citing Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917)).
175. Id. at 749 (citing United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 1961),
vacated as moot, 368 U.S. 14 (1961)) (emphasis added).
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bling charge for which he had already been convicted. 176 Next, the
court found that Malloy could not be prosecuted for certain related
gambling charges because the one-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to those charges had already expired before Malloy was subpoe-
naed. 177 Finally, the court noted that:
Malloy made no attempt even to suggest to the court how an answer to the
question[s] ... could possibly incriminate him .... On this state of the record
... Malloy's claim of privilege, made without explanation, was correctly over-
ruled. Malloy "chose to keep the door tightly closed and to deny the court the
smallest glimpse of the danger he apprehended. He cannot then complain
that we see none."
1 7 8
Although it noted that "[t]he fifth amendment does not apply, as
such, to state courts," 179 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in
Malloy nonetheless stated that the state standards that it had applied
were identical to "the settled [federal] rules defining the right to as-
sert a privilege against self-incrimination."1SO Indeed, when the
United States Supreme Court on certiorari in Malloy subsequently
"incorporated" the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,181 Connecticut strenuously insisted that "incorporation" should
not change the outcome in the instant case because its state courts
already had applied federal standards in protecting Malloy's privilege
against self-incrimination.182 Although the United States Supreme
Court ultimately ruled that Connecticut's courts in Malloy had misap-
plied the prevailing federal standard, the point of substantive disa-
greement between the Supreme Court and the Connecticut state
courts was quite narrow.18 3 Indeed, both courts purported to follow
the analysis of the scope of the privilege set forth in the same United
States Supreme Court precedent.18 4 Malloy thus illustrates the tru-
176. See id. at 748-49 (citing four federal cases).
177. See id. at 749-50 (citing state and federal cases).
178. Id. at 748 (quoting In re Pillo, 93 A.2d 176, 183 (N.J. 1952) (Brennan, J.); Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 489 (1951) (holding that a witness's explana-
tion of why he believed his answers to questions asked of him might incriminate
him is relevant to court's determination of whether privilege may be invoked)).
179. Id. at 750 (citing Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 118 n.1 (1961)).
180. Id.
181. Malloy v. Hagan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (reversing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947)).
182. Id. at 12.
183. See id. at 12-14 (agreeing with the Connecticut court that Malloy faced no contin-
uing jeopardy in connection with any of the 1959 events about which he was ques-
tioned, but holding that Malloy nonetheless should have been allowed to claim
privilege against self-incrimination because Malloy's answers to questions about
the 1959 events might furnish a link in a chain of evidence that might connect
Malloy with a more recent crime for which he might still be prosecuted).
184. Compare id. at 11-12 (applying legal standard set forth in Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)), with Malloy, 187 A.2d at 748-49 (same). The opin-
ion of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in Malloy also closely tracked the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mason v. United States, 244 U.S.
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ism that, in close cases, different courts can differ in their application
of an agreed legal standard to the same set of facts. However, Malloy
cannot fairly be said to have changed the substantive standard gov-
erning the privilege against self-incrimination in Connecticut or any
other state.
Nonetheless, certain implications of the "incorporation" of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination were not without con-
sequence. Specifically, although the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was long recognized in every state, before "incorporation" two key
aspects of the privilege varied in scope from state to state. These two
key aspects were: (1) the so-called "No Comment" Rule, which pre-
vented the prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's failure to
testify in his own defense; and (2) the scope of the right against self-
incrimination during police interrogations.
Before the right against self-incrimination was "incorporated"
against the states in 1964,185 six states permitted prosecutors or
judges to comment to the jury regarding a defendant's decision not to
testify,18 6 although forty-four states and the federal courts forbade
this practice.' 8 7 One year after deciding Malloy, the Supreme Court
in Griffin v. Californial 88 held that a state prosecutor could not com-
ment to the jury on a defendant's decision not to testify at trial with-
out violating the defendant's "incorporated" privilege against self-
incrimination.189 After Griffin, Ohio courts continued to permit pros-
362, 367 (1917), which held that a witness had no Fifth Amendment privilege to
refuse to answer questions about other men arrested for illegal gambling, where
the witness failed to explain how answering questions could incriminate himself.
185. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6.
186. The six states were California, Ohio, New Jersey, Iowa, Connecticut, and New
Mexico. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965) (surveying state
cases and statutes).
187. See id. (enumerating forty-four states). The "No Comment Rule" has been in
place in the federal courts since at least 1878, when Congress enacted it by stat-
ute. Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (1878) (currently codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2000)) ("In trial of all persons charged with the
commission of offenses against the United States. .. the person charged shall, at
his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall
not create any presumption against him.") (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
quickly interpreted this statute to forbid prosecutors from commenting on a de-
fendant's failure to testify. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893). In
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965), the Court held that the "No Com-
ment Rule" in the federal courts was mandated not merely by federal statute, but
also by the Fifth Amendment itself. That holding had been anticipated by dicta
inAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50 n.6 (1947), and Bruno v. United States,
308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
188. 380 U.S. 609 (1965), rev'g Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
189. For critical commentary, see Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REv. 929, 940 & n.63 (1965) ("Although it is now
settled that the fourteenth amendment 'incorporates' the protection of the fifth
against self-incrimination, the part of statesmanship would have been to recog-
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ecutors to comment on a defendant's decision to remain silent during
police interrogation. This practice, by that time unique to Ohio, was
struck down in Doyle v. Ohio,190 the last case in which the United
States Supreme Court found a violation of the "No Comment Rule."
Thus, "incorporation" of the right against self-incrimination did re-
quire six states to abandon the "No Comment Rule."
More significantly, "incorporation" of the right against self-incrimi-
nation directly led to the famous decision in Miranda v. Arizona,19 1
requiring police officers to inform a suspect subject to custodial inter-
rogation of the suspect's rights to remain silent and to receive the as-
sistance of counsel. Since at least the late nineteenth century,
virtually every state had recognized that the right against self-incrim-
ination applies during police interrogation as well as in court proceed-
ings. 192 Moreover, in adopting a warning requirement in Miranda,
the United States Supreme Court expressly followed an approach to
protecting the privilege against self-incrimination that had been de-
veloped in California state courts. 19 3 Prior to Miranda, however, no
state other than California required police officers to warn criminal
suspects of their rights.194
The Court in Miranda denied that its decision would impose uni-
formity on the states, and expressly provided for deviation from the
nize that the amendment is not 'specific' with respect to comment on a defen-
dant's failure to testify; that the 'federal rule' prohibiting this as to defendants
rested on statute; and that on such a 'penumbral' issue there was room for rea-
sonable experiment 'in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States.'"
(quoting Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
190. 426 U.S. 610, 613-14 (1976).
191. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
192. See J. A. C. Grant, Self-Incrimination in the Modern American Law, 5 TEMP. L.Q.
368 (1931). In this article, Grant reviews state and federal cases and concludes
that:
[T]he existence of the privilege is not dependent upon the nature of the
proceeding in which the testimony is sought, it being equally applicable
to any and all inquiries and investigations, civil as well as criminal,
whether in or out of court, and including, therefore, the activities of
grand juries, examining magistrates, administrative commissions, legis-
lative committees, or any other governmental agency or officer ....
Id. at 371-72. (emphasis added).
193. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471 (citing People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1965) (en
banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965)). In Dorado, the California Supreme
Court held that a defendant's confession must be suppressed when, inter alia,
"the suspect was in custody... [and] the authorities had not effectively informed
defendant of his right to counsel or of his absolute right to remain silent, and no
evidence establishes that he had waived these rights." Dorado, 398 P.2d at 371.
194. California had required warnings and waivers since at least the early twentieth
century. See People v. O'Bryan, 130 P. 1042, 1044-45 (Cal. 1913) (en banc) (testi-
mony of suspect who "was not informed of his constitutional right to decline to be
a witness against himself, nor was he warned that his statements might be used
against him.., should not have been admitted" because it was obtained in viola-
tion of constitutional right against self-incrimination).
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suggested Miranda warnings. 1 95 Nonetheless, the Miranda warning
and waiver requirements undoubtedly changed the substantive law of
many of the states. Though some states embraced this change,196
other states 19 7 and some commentators, 198 have considered Miranda
to be an illegitimate federal intrusion on state police procedure.
As with the exclusionary rule, public criticism of Miranda appears
to have led to a weakening of its requirements by the Supreme Court.
Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has carved out numerous
195. The Supreme Court in Miranda stated that:
[Tihe Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for
protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial in-
terrogation. Congress and the States are free to develop their own safe-
guards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those
described above in informing accused persons of their right of silence
and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490. In fact, Congress has attempted to overrule Miranda,
albeit to no avail. See Crime Control Act of 1968, Title II, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000)
(purporting to repeal Miranda and impose in its place a return to the voluntari-
ness standard), held unconstitutional in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000). To date, however, no state appears to have accepted the Miranda Court's
invitation to develop its own effective alternative safeguards as a substitute for
Miranda warnings.
196. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 fully "constitutionalized" the Miranda warn-
ings. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13 ("When any person has been arrested or detained in
connection with the investigation or commission of any offense, he shall be ad-
vised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his
right against self incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indi-
gent, his right to court appointed counsel."); see also LA. CONST. art. 1, § 16 ("No
person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself.") (previously codified
at LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 1, § 9).
197. The Pennsylvania Constitution was amended in 1984 to permit the admission of
un-Mirandized statements to impeach a defendant's trial testimony, as had been
allowed by the Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (amended 1984) ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused
... cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself .... The use of a sup-
pressed voluntary admission or voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of
a person may be permitted and shall not be construed as compelling a person to
give evidence against himself."). Pennsylvania's haste to constitutionalize a Mi-
randa exception appears to reflect hostility to the Miranda requirements.
198. During the Reagan Administration, a Justice Department Report asserted that:
[A] challenge to Miranda [was] essential, not only in overcoming the det-
rimental impact caused directly by this decision, but also as a critical
step in moving to repudiate a discredited criminal jurisprudence. Over-
turning Miranda would, accordingly, be among the most important
achievements of this administration-indeed of any administration-in
restoring the power of self-government to the people of the United States
in the suppression of crime.
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL ON THE LAw OF PRE-TRLL INTERROGATION 115 (1986) reprinted in Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Confessions, Criminals and Community, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 327, 345 (1991); see also Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empiri-
cal Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
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exceptions to Miranda's warning and waiver requirements, allowing
many "un-Mirandized" statements to be admitted into evidence in
state criminal cases. 19 9 In fact, just eight years after deciding Mi-
randa, the Court announced that the Miranda warnings and waivers
are "not themselves rights protected by the constitution," but merely
"prophylactic standards" designed to "safeguard" the constitutional
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 20 0 Although the Su-
preme Court, on increasingly rare occasions, has continued to enforce
Miranda requirements against state officials,2 0 it has simultaneously
199. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (finding statements admissi-
ble even when suspect was incorrectly "warned" that he had no right to counsel
until court appearance); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (holding that
police may deceive suspect about the purpose of the questioning in order to elicit
Miranda waiver); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that men-
tally ill suspect can waive Miranda rights); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986) (finding Mirandized statement admissible when counsel had been re-
tained on behalf of suspect, even though suspect did not know that counsel had
been retained and had no contact with counsel until after making statement);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985) (holding "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine inapplicable to Miranda violations, allowing admission of evidence de-
rived from un-Mirandized statement); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
657-58 (1984) (creating "public safety" exception to Miranda, under which police
may question suspect without giving warnings where necessary to avoid potential
imminent danger); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding that
"express" waiver of Miranda rights not required for statement to be admitted);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (same, even where Miranda violation is de-
liberate rather than inadvertent); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)
(finding un-Mirandized statements may be used to impeach testimony of sus-
pect); see also Ronald J. Allen, Tribute to Fred Inbau, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
oGy 1271, 1272 (1999) ("Immediately following [Miranda], the Supreme Court...
began its retreat .... [T]he Court refused to extend the case retroactively; it held
it created only prophylactic rules, not constitutional commands; the rules could
be flexibly administered; waiver could occur simply and directly without the need
of a well defined script; the rule did not apply at all to on the scene questioning or
when a serious question of public safety was at stake. And so on."); Mark A.
Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law-The International
Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators
from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 855 (2003) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court
has carved numerous exceptions to Miranda's applicability within the United
States.").
200. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974). In Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed that, notwith-
standing any dicta to the contrary in Tucker and other opinions, "Miranda is a
constitutional decision." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438. At the same time, the Dick-
erson court acknowledged that the adoption of numerous exceptions to Miranda's
warning and waiver requirements illustrated "that no constitutional rule is im-
mutable." Id. at 441.
201. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam) (finding that police of-
ficer's subjective and undisclosed view that witness was not yet "suspect" at time
of custodial interrogation did not excuse officer's failure to provide Miranda
warnings); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (holding that after
a suspect requests counsel and initial interrogation ends, officials may not reini-
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unmoored those requirements from their doctrinal origins as an as-
pect of the "incorporation" of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. 20 2 As a result of this unmooring, the
Court's analysis in cases involving claims by state criminal defendants
that the defendants' self-incriminatory statements were compelled,
has tended increasingly to focus on "voluntariness"-the precise pre-
Miranda standard that the Court applied under the Due Process
Clause in the decades before the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination was "incorporated" against the states.2 03
The Miranda decision, when it came down in 1966, clearly had the
potential to change the substantive law of state criminal procedure in
the majority of American states. It announced a rule requiring state
law enforcement officers to provide express warnings to individuals in
custodial interrogation that were not then required under the law of
most states.20 4 It also imposed a significant remedy-exclusion of tes-
timonial evidence-for violations of that rule.20 5 In the years since
Miranda, however, the Supreme Court has retreated significantly
from both the rule and the associated remedy announced in Miranda.
tiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has con-
sulted with his attorney); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)
(holding that a suspect who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates fur-
ther communication").
202. See Godsey, supra note 199, at 864 ("Quarles and the other Miranda-exception
cases have not completely overruled Miranda in the sense that the basic warning/
waiver procedure has been retained in most scenarios as the initial inquiry in
determining the admissibility of a confession. But the warnings have become de-
tached from the privilege and the concept of compulsion.").
203. See id. at 865 ("[W]here the Miranda doctrine is inapplicable [as it increasingly
is], the "back-up" test for the admissibility of a confession is not whether it was
compelled in violation of the privilege, but whether it was made voluntarily under
the old due process involuntary confession rule. The Miranda-exception cases
have continued to insist that the privilege and its prohibition of compelled confes-
sions remain applicable to the pretrial interrogation context. Yet, for reasons left
unstated, the Court has declined to provide clear guidance on the precise role of
the privilege in police interrogations, and has continued instead to emphasize
pre-Miranda notions of due process and voluntariness.") (footnotes omitted).
204. The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that:
[Wihen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning... [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
205. See id. at 479 ("[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by
the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.").
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At present, the Court's Miranda jurisprudence no longer significantly
alters the self-incrimination law of any state. All fifty states exclude
self-incriminatory statements that are the product of actual coercion,
as they always have. Miranda, as presently interpreted, very rarely
does anything more. The Supreme Court's promulgation of the Mi-
randa rules arguably represented the most significant real-world con-
sequence of Fourteenth Amendment "incorporation," as a limit on
state power, of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. Yet even here, the Court's retreat from Miranda
has dramatically limited the practical impact of "incorporation" of this
privilege on the substantive law of state criminal procedure in the fifty
states.
D. Public Trial
The Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a. . . public
trial."206 In so providing, the Clause reflects the fact that
"[h]istorically, virtually all criminal trials in England and America
have been trials open to the public."2 0 7 The right to a public criminal
trial, to a great extent, overlaps many of the other rights in the Bill of
Rights. The rights to a jury trial, to counsel, to confrontation of wit-
ness, and to compulsory process for summoning exculpatory wit-
nesses, insure that a criminal defendant will not be left alone in a
courtroom, to be convicted in secrecy by a "Star Chamber."208 In addi-
tion, the First Amendment right to freedom of the press, in many in-
stances, entitles the media to have access to a criminal trial,
206. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
207. AMAR, supra note 14, at 111; accord In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The Court
in Oliver noted that:
[W]e have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial con-
ducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the
history of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such
secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star
Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly
is in dispute.
Id. at 266 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, The Right to a Public Trial in Crimi-
nal Cases, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1138, 1140 (1966) (concluding that all states recog-
nize the right to public trial either by constitutional provision, statute or judicial
interpretation).
208. See generally Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-71 (chronicling common law origins of the
right to a public trial); Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381,
389 (1932) (explaining history of the provision as a reaction against British "Star
Chamber"); Note, The Right to a Public Trial in Criminal Cases, supra note 207
(examining relationship between right to public trial and other criminal proce-
dure rights).
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sometimes making the trial more public than the defendant would
like!20 9
In 1948, when In re Oliver,21o a case arising out of Michigan, "in-
corporated" the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, the Michigan
Constitution of 1908 guaranteed that: "In every criminal prosecution,
the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury .... ,211 Moreover, this state constitutional provision
had not been forgotten or honored in the breach. To the contrary, even
prior to 1948, the constitutional right of an accused person to demand
a public trial had long been recognized and strongly protected by
Michigan state courts. 2 12 It had also long been reinforced by Michi-
gan statute.2 13
In Oliver, the defendant was subpoenaed to testify before a state
judge who was "sitting as a one-man grand jury" to conduct an investi-
gation into allegations of gambling and official corruption. 2 14 Consis-
tent with ordinary grand jury procedure, the defendant's testimony
before the "one-man grand jury" was secret, with members of the pub-
lic excluded from the proceeding. 2 15 At the conclusion of the defen-
dant's testimony, the judge sitting as the "one-man grand jury"
concluded that the defendant had testified "evasively" and had given
209. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (holding that the media
has a right to cover criminal trial over defendant's objection).
210. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
211. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. II, § 19. For the current codification, see MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 20.
212. See, e.g., People v. Micalizzi, 194 N.W. 540, 541-42 (Mich. 1923) (reversing first-
degree murder conviction on ground that defendant had been deprived of state
constitutional right to public trial where court, during charge, ordered doors of
courtroom locked and did not permit several of defendant's attorneys and the
public to enter, though the courtroom was not crowded); People v. Yeager, 71
N.W. 491, 492 (Mich. 1897) (striking down as unconstitutional a statute provid-
ing that when evidence of peculiarly immoral acts will probably be given on a
trial, the judge may, in his discretion, require all persons except those necessarily
in attendance to retire from the courtroom during the trial); People v. Murray, 50
N.W. 995, 997-98 (Mich. 1891) ("The right to a public trial is one of the most
important safeguards in the prosecution of persons accused of crime .... It is not
necessary to review the history of the administration of the criminal law in En-
gland, or to call attention to the abuses in its administration, to show the reason
why [this] important provision[ ] [was] inserted in our constitution, which, in this
respect, is but a reflection of similar provisions contained in all of the constitu-
tions of the American states and of the United States. They are each ... a con-
stant memorial of the great abuses practiced in England at one time and another
prior to the American Revolution, in conducting criminal prosecutions.").
213. MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 600.1420 (West 1996) ("The sittings of every court
within this state shall be public."). This statute was originally enacted in 1846.
See Micalizzi, 194 N.W. at 541 (citing 1846 version of the statute).
214. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 260.
215. Id. at 259.
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"contradictory answers."2 16 For this reason, the judge held the defen-
dant in contempt and ordered him "confined in the County Jail... for
a period of sixty days... or until such time as he... shall appear and
answer the questions heretofore propounded to him by this Court
"217
Reviewing a petition for state habeas corpus relief filed on behalf of
the defendant, the Michigan Supreme Court, by an equally divided
vote, did not vacate the defendant's contempt conviction. 2 18 Voting to
sustain the conviction, four justices of the Michigan Supreme Court
stated that because the defendant's "contempt, if any, was committed
in the face of the court and required no extraneous proofs as to its
occurrence,... [i]t was properly dealt with summarily."2 19 These four
justices reasoned that it would be an "idle gesture"-not required by
the state constitution-to require a "one-man grand jury" proceeding
to be formally adjourned, and a public court session to be formally "re-
convened," before a judge serving as a "one-man grand jury" could
hold a recalcitrant grand jury witness in contempt.22 0
The other four Michigan Supreme Court justices, in contrast, voted
to overrule the defendant's contempt conviction on the ground that no
criminal conviction, even for "contempt," could lawfully be sustained
in a case in which no evidentiary record had been made or preserved
for appellate review. 22 1 Relying on federal constitutional precedent as
persuasive authority, these four justices would have invalidated the
defendant's contempt conviction on the ground that the failure of the
judge who had served as the "one-man grand jury" to make a record of
the proceeding that had led to the defendant's contempt conviction
mandated that the conviction be vacated.2 22 Notably, however, even
the four justices who voted to vacate the defendant's contempt convic-
216. Id. at 260.
217. Id.
218. In re Dohany (Ex parte Oliver), 27 N.W.2d 323 (Mich. 1947), rev'd, Oliver, 333
U.S. 257. Because the Michigan Supreme Court in Oliver was equally divided,
the lower court's decision denying the defendant's petition for writ of habeas
corpus was sustained, but no precedent was established.
219. In re Dohany (Exparte Hartley), 27 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Mich. 1947) (plurality opinion
of Dethmers, J.), overruled by Oliver, 333 U.S. 257.
220. Id.
221. See Dohany (Ex parte Oliver), 27 N.W.2d at 328 (Worth, J.) ("Contempt proceed-
ings are criminal in their nature rather than civil .... [T]he power to imprison
for contempt . . . should be exercised with great caution, and only upon proof
which establishes the facts found beyond a reasonable doubt, or which must, in
any event, be clear and convincing." (quoting In re D. Levy & Co., 142 F. 442, 444
(2d Cir. 1905))).
222. See id. ("Had the above practice been pursued in the instant case a record might
or might not have been made which would have disclosed justification for a con-
tempt commitment. But on the record before us a determination in accord with
that of the circuit judge would be based on pure guess or merest conjecture. Such
a record does not justify punishment for contempt of court . . ").
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tion did not assert that the defendant's right to a public trial was vio-
lated by the failure of the trial judge serving as a "one-man grand
jury" to open the defendant's contempt proceeding to the public-ap-
parently because the defendant failed to raise the issue.22 3
The specific question of whether the secrecy of the contempt pro-
ceeding before the "one-man grand jury" violated the Oliver defen-
dant's constitutional right to a public trial also was not raised in the
defendant's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court.2 24 Nonetheless, in Oliver the United States Supreme Court
"incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment the right to a public
trial, and vacated the defendant's state contempt conviction. 2 25 In so
doing, the Court noted that it had been "unable to find a single in-
stance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or
municipal court during the history of this country."2 26 It further
noted that "[s] ummary trials for alleged misconduct called contempt of
court have not been regarded as an exception to this universal rule
against secret trials ... ."227 Nor had any state other than Michigan
223. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 286 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The principal ground assigned
for reversal of the judgment of conviction is the alleged secrecy of the contempt
procedure. That ground was not . . . raised in the petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the state courts. Therefore, it has not been litigated and the record has
not been made with reference to it."); accord id. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he precise issues on which this Court decides this case have never been
explicitly challenged before, or passed on, by the Supreme Court of Michigan
224. See id. at 286 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The principal ground assigned for rever-
sal of the judgment of conviction is the alleged secrecy of the contempt procedure.
That ground was not assigned for review in the petition for certiorari to this
Court.").
225. Id. at 273 ("In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their
inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our federal and
state governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law
means at least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison.").
226. Id. at 266 (footnote omitted); accord id. at 271-72 ("[U]nless in Michigan and in
one-man grand jury contempt cases, no court in this country has ever before held,
so far as we can find, that an accused can be tried, convicted, and sent to jail,
when everybody else is denied entrance to the court, except the judge and his
attaches. And without exception all courts have held that an accused is at the
very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter
with what offense he may be charged.") (footnote omitted). The Court noted that
"[clases within the jurisdiction of courts martial may be regarded as an excep-
tion." Id. at 266 n.12 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43 (1942)). It further
noted that "[w]hatever may be the classification of juvenile court proceedings,
they are often conducted without admitting all the public. But it has never been
the practice wholly to exclude parents, relatives, and friends, or to refuse
juveniles the benefit of counsel." Id.
227. Id. at 266 (footnote omitted).
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ever categorically denied public trials to defendants charged with con-
tempt of a grand jury.228
Since Oliver, there has been little or no state or federal litigation,
or public controversy, concerning the right of criminal defendants to
receive a public trial. This relative quietude may reflect the fact that
the right of criminal defendants to receive a public trial was very well
established in the constitutional law of every state long before Oli-
ver.229 Certainly, Michigan courts both before2 30 and after 23 1 Oliver
have always construed the Michigan Constitution to strongly protect
the right to a public trial.
Including Michigan, the right to a public criminal trial has always
been expressly protected by the constitutions of forty-two states. 23 2
One state, Virginia, lacked such an express provision until 1971, when
228. See id. at 265 ("Even when witnesses before grand juries refuse to answer proper
questions, the grand juries do not adjudge the witnesses guilty of contempt of
court in secret or in public or at all. Witnesses who refuse to testify before grand
juries are tried on contempt charges before judges sitting in open court.") (foot-
note omitted). But cf. id. at 272 & n.30 ("Certain proceedings in a judge's cham-
bers, including convictions for contempt of court, have occasionally been
countenanced by state courts, but there has never been any intimation that all of
the public, including the accused's relatives, friends, and counsel, were barred
from the trial chamber.").
229. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1785, at 662 (1833) (noting that the Sixth Amendment's Public Trial
Clause 'does but follow out the established course of the common law in all trials
for crimes. The trial is always public"); see also Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266 (surveying
state constitutional "public trial" doctrine); Note, The Right to a Public Trial in
Criminal Cases, supra note 207 (same).
230. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Recorder's Court Judge, 294 N.W.2d 827, 833
n.17 (Mich. 1980) ("The right of an accused to demand a public trial has long been
recognized as a fundamental right in Michigan jurisprudence.") (citations omit-
ted); Note, Public Trial in Criminal Cases, 52 MICH. L. REV. 128, 133 & n.39
(1953) (asserting that the right to a public trial in Michigan is protected more
strongly in Michigan than in other states; in Michigan, unlike elsewhere, "[a]
public trial ... means something more than a fair trial and therefore is not to be
strictly limited to classes of persons necessary to insure a fair trial" (citing People
v. Greeson, 203 N.W. 141 (Mich. 1925); People v. Murray, 50 N.W. 995, 997-98
(Mich. 1891))).
231. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 294 N.W.2d at 833-34 & nn.17-18 (Mich. 1980) (holding
that trial and conviction of an accused in secret, even in a contempt proceeding,
will be grounds for reversal; therefore, accused may not waive right to public
trial); People v. Medcoff, 73 N.W.2d 537,541 (Mich. 1955) ("[Plublic trial" guaran-
tee of the Michigan constitution is "fundamental to a criminal proceeding ... ");
People v. Kline, 494 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that al-
though the state constitutional right to a public trial "is not absolute, that right
will only rarely give way to other interests" (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39
(1984))).
232. For a survey of the state law on the right to a public trial at the time the Sixth
Amendment was "incorporated," see Oliver, 333 U.S. at 267-68 nn.17-20.
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it added one. 23 3 Of the seven remaining states, New York234 and Ne-
vada 235 have always protected the right to a public trial by statute,
while Maryland, 236 Massachusetts,237 New Hampshire, 238 North Car-
olina, 239 and Wyoming 240 have protected it as a matter of "constitu-
tional common law" or under their state constitutional "due process
clauses."241 Accordingly, "incorporation" of the right to a public trial
changed, at most, one rarely-used aspect of the substantive law of one
233. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (ratified in 1971) (copying the Sixth Amendment verbatim).
At least since 1950, however, Virginia has protected the right to a public trial by
statute. The Virginia statute provides that:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misde-
meanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any
persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, pro-
vided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (1994) (emphasis added).
234. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 12 (McKinney 1992) (copying Sixth Amendment ver-
batim); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 4 (McKinney 1983) ("The sittings of every court within
this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same ....").
These two statutory provisions are to be construed in pari materia with each
other, to protect the same rights protected by the Sixth Amendment, after which
they were patterned. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174, 179
(App. Div. 1953), affd, 123 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1954).
235. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.090 (1993) ("The sitting of every court of justice shall be
public.... ."); see also Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268 n.19 (citing Nevada as a state where
the right to a public trial has always been protected by statute).
236. See La Guardia v. State, 58 A.2d 913, 916 (Md. 1948) (finding that the right to
public trial is protected by state constitutional provision guaranteeing "that the
Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the
trial by Jury, according to the course of that law" (quoting MD. CoNsT. dec. of rts.
art. 5)); accord Dutton v. State, 91 A. 417, 422-23 (Md. 1914); see also Oliver, 333
U.S. at 268 n.20 (counting Maryland among states where right to public trial
always was protected).
237. See Commonwealth v. Blondin, 87 N.E.2d 455, 459-60 (Mass. 1949) (aligning
Massachusetts "public trial" jurisprudence with that of states whose constitu-
tions contained express "public trial" provision), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950);
see also MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16C (1992) (trial judge may exclude
spectators from courtroom during incest or rape trial, but only if "the defendant
in such trial by a written statement waives his right to a public trial for those
portions from which spectators are so excluded") (emphasis added).
238. See Martineau v. Helgemoe, 379 A.2d 1040, 1041 (N.H. 1977) ("[A]lthough there
is no specific reference to the right to a public trial in our state constitution, it is
protected by the requirement of due process." (citing N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15)).
239. See Raper v. Berrier, 97 S.E.2d 782, 784 (N.C. 1957) ("The tradition of our courts
is that their hearings shall be open. The Constitution of North Carolina so pro-
vides .... The public, and especially the parties are entitled to see and hear
what goes on in the courts .... That courts are open is one of the sources of their
greatest strength." (citing N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 35) ("All courts shall be open
240. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 325 (Wyo. 1979) ("There is almost universal
agreement among the courts, which have considered the right-of-access issue,
that access to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional
circumstances.").
241. See supra notes 236-40.
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state, Michigan, in which the right to a public trial was otherwise
well-established.
E. Criminal Jury Trial
Even before the Bill of Rights was written or ratified, the United
States Constitution guaranteed trial by jury in federal criminal prose-
cutions. Article III provides that "[tihe Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury .. "242 The Bill of Rights
repeats this guarantee, as a right of the accused: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed .... "243 The Supreme Court has stated that the
Sixth Amendment merely "amplified" the protection found in Article
III, and did not add any substance to it.244 Similarly, every state con-
stitution has always guaranteed the right to jury trial in criminal
cases.
2 4 5
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court "incorporated" the right
to criminal jury trial as a limit on state power in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana.24 6 At that time, the Louisiana Constitution, like that of every
other state, guaranteed that: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury."24 7
However, unlike any other state, 2 48 Louisiana at that time qualified
242. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 3.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
244. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888). For the contrary view that the right
to jury trial articulated in Article III belongs primarily to the public (and thus
should not be waivable by the criminal defendant), while the right to jury trial
articulated in the Sixth Amendment belongs primarily to the criminal defendant,
see AmAR, supra note 14, at 104-08.
245. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968); see also AmAR, supra note 14, at
83 & n.7 ("[Tihe only right secured in all state constitutions penned between 1776
and 1787 was the right ofjury trial in criminal cases." (citing LEONARD W. LEVY,
THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 227 (1985))); THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
STATES xix (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds. 1992) (listing criminal
jury provisions found in each of the revolutionary declarations of rights and
constitutions).
246. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
247. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 7 § 41 (previously codified at LA. CONST. of 1913, art. 9
and LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 9, and currently codified as amended at LA. CONST.
art. 1, § 16).
248. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 ("In 49 of the 50 States crimes subject to trial with-
out jury ... are [misdemeanors] punishable by no more than one year in jail.").
New Hampshire's constitution, like Louisiana's, did not expressly protect the
right to jury trial in noncapital criminal cases. See N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 16
("Nor shall the legislature make any law that shall subject any person to a capital
punishment . . . without trial by jury.") (emphasis added). Nonetheless, New
Hampshire courts had long interpreted the state constitution's "law of the land"
clause to protect a defendant's right to jury trial even in noncapital criminal
cases. See, e.g., State v. Gerry, 38 A. 272, 272 (N.H. 1896) ("It has never been
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its constitutional guarantee of the right to criminal jury trial by pro-
viding that "[c ases in which the punishment is not necessarily impris-
onment at hard labor or death, shall be tried by the court without a
jury or by a jury less than twelve in number."2 49
The Duncan case arose when Gary Duncan, a 19 year-old Afri-
can-American, intervened in a street confrontation between two of his
young relatives, a nephew and cousin, and four white boys. 2 50 Each of
the boys involved was about twelve years old; all attended the same
public school, which had just recently been desegregated by order of a
federal district court. 2 5 1 Duncan was charged with simple battery, al-
legedly for slapping one of the white boys-the stepson of the local
justice of the peace-on the arm.2 52 Under Louisiana law, simple bat-
tery was then classified as a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum
of two years imprisonment and a $300 fine.2 53 Although Duncan
sought a jury trial, the Louisiana state courts refused, holding that
"because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in
which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be im-
denied or doubted that by this article trial by jury... is secured to the defendant
in all criminal cases without exception."); accord Copp v. Henniker, 55 N.H. 179,
195 (1875). New Hampshire's "law of the land" clause provides: "No subject shall
be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or
privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, lib-
erty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.. .. " N.H.
CONsT. pt. 1, art. 15.
249. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 7, § 41 (previously codified at LA. CONST. of 1913, art. 9
and LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 9). This qualification was removed in 1974, when
Louisiana adopted its current state constitution. See Lee Hargrave, Declaration
of Rights of Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 55-57 (1974) (dis-
cussing changes in Louisiana state constitutional right to criminal jury trial that
were implemented by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution). As amended again in
1998, Louisiana's constitution now provides:
A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a
verdict. A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at
hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom
must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment may be
confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more
than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, all of whom
must concur to render a verdict.
LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17(A) (as amended in 1998); see also La. Acts 1997, No. 1502,
§ 1 (1998) (amending 1974 constitution to require six-member juries to achieve
unanimity).
250. Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1971).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 559. This allegation was disputed by Duncan and his relatives, who each
testified at Duncan's trial that Duncan had not slapped the young white boy, but
rather had merely touched him. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147. It was undisputed
that the white boy was not hurt, and displayed no bruise minutes after the inci-
dent. Duncan, 445 F.2d at 560.
253. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146 & n.1 (citing LA. REV. STAT. 14:35 (1950)).
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posed," Duncan did not have a state constitutional right to a jury
trial.2 5
4
Following a nonjury trial before a local justice of the peace, Duncan
was convicted of simple battery and sentenced to two months in prison
and a fine of $150.00, with an additional twenty days in prison if the
fine was not paid.255 In an unpublished summary disposition, the
Louisiana Supreme Court refused to review Duncan's case.2 56
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court "incorporated" the
right to jury trial in state criminal cases into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and reversed Duncan's conviction. 2 5 7 In holding that states
were required to provide jury trials in serious criminal cases, the Su-
preme Court noted that "[t]he laws of every State guarantee a right to
jury trial in serious criminal cases; no State has dispensed with it; nor
are there significant movements underway to do so."258 At the same
time, the Duncan Court also acknowledged the existence of "a cate-
gory of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth
Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Four-
teenth Amendment jury trial requirement here applied to the
States."25 9 While declining to specify "the exact location of the line
between petty offenses and serious crimes," the Duncan Court stated
that crimes punishable by more than one year in prison would be pre-
sumed to be sufficiently "serious" to implicate the constitutional right
to jury trial.260 In so concluding, the Court noted that Louisiana was
254. Id. at 146.
255. See id.; Duncan, 445 F.2d at 559. The justice of the peace who convicted Duncan
did not issue a written opinion in the case.
256. State v. Duncan, 195 So. 2d 142 (La. 1967) (summary disposition), rev'd, Duncan,
391 U.S. 145.
257. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50 ("Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-
were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee. Since we consider the appeal before us to be such a case, we
hold that the Constitution was violated when appellant's demand for jury trial
was refused.") (footnotes omitted).
258. Id. at 154.
259. Id. at 159; see also id. at 160 ("So-called petty offenses were tried without juries
both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt
from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
provisions."); Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (holding that jury trial
is not required for trials of 'petty offenses" carrying possible penalties up to six
months); Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and
the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REV. 917, 981 (1926)
("[So far as history is a guide those multitudinous infractions of the detailed
rules of modern society which we significantly group as police regulations need
not be enforced with all the paraphernalia of jury trial.").
260. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62. In a subsequent case, the Court determined
"that no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury
448 [Vol. 84:397
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already the only jurisdiction that did not already provide a jury trial
in all such cases.26 1
Thus, at most, Duncan's "incorporation" of the right to criminal
jury trial changed the substantive law of only one state-Louisiana-
by requiring that state to provide jury trials in certain "serious" crimi-
nal cases involving crimes punishable by more than one year in
prison, but less than hard labor. Yet, for three reasons, even this con-
clusion may overstate the practical significance of the Supreme
Court's decision to "incorporate" the right to criminal jury trial in
Duncan.
First, as a practical matter, even prior to Duncan, jury trials were
ordinarily provided to most criminal defendants facing felony charges
in Louisiana. Notably, the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 did not pro-
hibit jury trials in such cases. Rather, it provided that "cases in which
the penalty is not necessarily imprisonment at hard labor, or death,
shall be tried by the court without a jury or by a jury less than twelve
in number."26 2 In a separate provision, the Louisiana Constitution of
1921 formerly provided that such cases could be tried before "bob-
tailed jur[ies] of five with unanimous consent required."2 6 3 Moreover,
because conviction for the vast majority of felonies in pre-Duncan Lou-
isiana carried with it the potential for a sentence of imprisonment at
hard labor, Louisiana courts had held that a jury trial was required in
virtually all non-misdemeanor cases. 26 4
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized." Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
261. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 & n.33 ("In 49 of the 50 States crimes subject to trial
without a jury, which occasionally include simple battery, are punishable by no
more than one year in jail." (citing applicable statutes and cases)).
262. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 7, § 41 (emphasis added) (previously codified at LA.
CONST. of 1913, art. 9 and LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 9). This language does not
appear in the current Louisiana Constitution, which was ratified in 1974. See
supra note 249; see also Hargrave, supra note 249, at 55-57 (1974) (discussing
changes in Louisiana state constitutional right to criminal jury trial that were
implemented by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution).
263. Hargrave, supra note 249, at 56 & n.300 (citing LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 7, § 41)
(discussing La. Acts 1997, No. 1502, § 1 (approved by public referendum Oct. 3,
1998, effective Nov. 5, 1998)). A modified version of this language was carried
over into article 1, section 17(A) of the Louisiana Constitution. See supra note
249. As amended in 1998, article 1, section 17(A) now requires a six-member jury
in a criminal case to achieve unanimity before a judgment on the jury's verdict
may be rendered.
264. Under pre-Duncan Louisiana law, crimes that were punishable by "imprison-
ment with or without hard labor" were called "relative felonies," and had been
held to require a jury trial even where the actual sentence imposed did not in-
clude hard labor. See, e.g., State v. Green, 26 So.2d 693, 694 (La. 1946) ("Accord-
ing to section 41 of article VII of the [1921] Constitution a prosecution for theft of
property of a value exceeding $20 but less than $100, being punishable by impris-
onment with or without hard labor, is triable by a jury of 5 members, unless the
defendant waives his right to the trial by jury.... ."); see also, e.g., State v. Gable,
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Second, although Louisiana's constitutional protection for jury
trial in criminal cases lagged behind that offered by the other forty-
nine states, this gap was already beginning to close by the time
Duncan was decided. In 1973, just five years after Duncan, Louisiana
held a constitutional convention to replace its outdated constitution of
1921. At this convention, "the framers of the [new] state constitution
... ma[d]e it clear that the state constitutional guarantee of the right
to a jury in criminal cases was intended to incorporate then-existing
federal precedents."265 Consistent with both federal precedent and its
framers' intentions, the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 now guaran-
tees the right of jury trial in all criminal cases where the defendant is
subject to punishment by more than six months of imprisonment.2 66
After Duncan, of course, Louisiana would have been bound under the
Fourteenth Amendment to comply with applicable federal precedents
even if it had not codified those federal precedents in its new state
constitution. Nonetheless, nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quired Louisiana to lend its own imprimatur to the constitutional doc-
trine set forth in those federal precedents, or to codify that doctrine
into the Louisiana Constitution. 26 7 For that reason, Louisiana's vol-
untary decision to do so in 1974 does manifest the state's endorse-
ment, albeit belatedly, of Duncan's substantive principle that every
person accused of a serious crime who is potentially subject to more
than six months imprisonment is entitled to receive a trial by jury.
Third, it should be noted that the Duncan case itself was more
than a run-of-the-mill "simple battery" case. Rather, the case received
12 So. 2d 809, 810 (La. 1943) (holding that where defendant charged with theft of
property worth $35 faced potential sentence of imprisonment, with or without
hard labor, for not more than two years, "it is clear that defendant was properly
tried by a jury of five" (citing LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 7, § 41)).
265. John Devlin & David Hilburn, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 52 LA. L. REV. 575,
600-01 & n.120 (1992)) (citing VII Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Con-
vention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 1184 (1977)); accord id. (noting that the
records of the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention "reflect[ ] the intent of
the drafters that the criminal jury guarantee of the state constitution track the
substantive requirements of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), among
other federal precedents").
266. See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17(A) (amended 1998) ("A case in which the punishment
may be confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more
than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, all of whom must
concur to render a verdict."). This provision codifies the federal precedents an-
nounced in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970), which held that a jury
trial is required for all crimes punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment, and Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), which held that a criminal jury
must consist of at least six members.
267. Compare, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:32.9 (Supp. 2004) (enacted 1997) (contain-
ing an unenforceable provision purporting to prohibit "partial birth abortion" pro-
cedure, which remains on books notwithstanding the decision of United States
Supreme Court in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
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extraordinarily heavy attention in its time, because it was widely per-
ceived as a proxy battle over the federal courts' enforcement of school
desegregation in Louisiana.268 The case also produced substantial
satellite litigation, primarily under the Equal Protection Clause.2 69
Indeed, the case was so politically and racially charged, and so visible,
that the Louisiana legislature immediately responded to the Supreme
Court's decision in Duncan by reducing the maximum sentence for
simple battery from two years to six months, seemingly in order to
force Duncan to face retrial without a jury.2 70 Ultimately, a federal
district judge enjoined the District Attorney of Plaquemines Parish,
Louisiana, from further prosecuting Duncan, after finding that the en-
tire prosecution had been instituted "in bad faith and for purposes of
harassment," and that the retrial of Duncan would "deter and sup-
press the exercise of federally secured rights by Negroes in Pla-
quemines Parish."271
Undoubtedly, Gary Duncan was a victim of invidious racial dis-
crimination perpetrated by a vindictive local government under color
of state law. In this regard, Duncan's equal protection claim was vir-
tually archetypal, and it is altogether fitting that he prevailed in ad-
vancing that claim.2 72 At the same time, it must be noted that the
"incorporation" of the right to criminal jury trial in Duncan did not
end the racial harassment that Duncan was made to endure. Nor, it
268. See, e.g., Duncan v. Perez, 321 F. Supp. 181, 184-85 (E.D. La. 1970), affd, 445
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The various stages of the Duncan and Sobol cases have
been thoroughly publicized in the New Orleans papers .... Not only did the
charge against him relate to the occasional racial violence that accompanied the
integration of the Boothville-Venice School, the civil rights overtones of the case
were underscored by the participation of civil rights attorneys, by the appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States, and by the arrest of [Duncan's attorney]
and the extensive proceedings which followed.").
269. For further insight into the racial bitterness that permeated this and related pro-
ceedings, see id.; Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968); United States
v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 291 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. La. 1967), affd, 415 F.2d
817 (5th Cir. 1969). During the course of Duncan's simple battery prosecution,
Duncan was subjected to multiple arrests, repeated resettings of unusually high
pre-conviction bail, an unlawful demand for a double appeal bond, prejudicial
comments by the prosecutor and the state trial judge, and the arrest of his chief
counsel on a baseless charge of the unlawful practice of law. Duncan v. Perez,
445 F.2d 557, 559 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971).
270. Duncan, 445 F.2d at 559 n.2.
271. Duncan, 321 F. Supp. at 184. In particular, the federal district court found that:
If Duncan were required to face retrial, it would constitute an unmistak-
able message to Negroes in Plaquemines Parish that it is unprofitable to
step outside familiar patterns and to seek to rely on federal rights to
oppose the policies of certain parish officials. The destructive effect on
the exercise of federal rights could not be corrected by Duncan's possible
subsequent success in state or federal court.
Id. at 185.
272. For further discussion of the relationship between "incorporation" and equal pro-
tection, see Katkin, supra note 71.
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would appear, did it change the substantive law of any state other
than Louisiana in any way. Even in Louisiana, as a practical matter,
Duncan's "incorporation" of the Sixth Amendment right to criminal
jury trial extended that right only to a small class of minor felony
cases in which jury trials were not already being provided in Louisi-
ana in 1968. Moreover, since Louisiana adopted its current constitu-
tion in 1974, the right to jury trial has been guaranteed by the
Louisiana Constitution in every criminal case in which it is protected
under Duncan. Today, the constitution of every state protects the
right to jury trial in every criminal case in which the same right is
protected by "incorporation" of the Sixth Amendment.
There are several respects, however, in which the scope and defini-
tion of the right to criminal jury trial does continue to vary from state
to state. The major subjects of continued variation are jury waiver
rights, jury size, and juror unanimity requirements.
Since at least 1908, federal courts have permitted criminal defend-
ants to waive the right to jury trial. 2 73 Although the states have not
been unanimous on this point, "incorporation" has not affected a crim-
inal defendant's right to waive a jury trial in state court. Today,
North Carolina is the only state in which a criminal defendant cannot
waive a jury trial.274 However, only ten states-Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and West Virginia-follow the federal approach of vesting
the defendant with an absolute right to waive a jury trial.2 75
Nineteen states-Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming-require the consent of both the prosecutor and the court
for a criminal defendant to waive a jury trial.2 76 The remaining
twenty states require the consent of either the prosecutor or the court
for a criminal defendant to waive a jury trial.2 77 "Incorporation" of
the Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury trial has never been held
to vest state criminal defendants with the same unilateral right to
waive jury trial enjoyed by federal criminal defendants.
Since the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has held
that the Sixth Amendment fixes the size of federal juries at twelve
273. Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801 (1st Cir. 1908), cited in Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 293-96 (1930). In Patton, the Supreme Court overruled its
earlier decision in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), which had held that
the Sixth Amendment did not permit waiver of the right to trial by jury in a
federal prosecution.
274. V. HALE STARR & MARK McCoRMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO
JURY LAW AND METHODS § 2.3 (2d ed. 1993).
275. Id. § 2.3, at 40 & n.2.
276. Id. § 2.3, at 40 & n.1.
277. Id. § 2.3.
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members. 278 In practice, the twelve member federal jury dates back
farther than the Bill of Rights.279 Despite "incorporating" the Sixth
Amendment right to criminal jury trial, however, the Court has never
incorporated the requirement that a jury consist of twelve jurors. In
Williams v. Florida,28O the Court upheld a Florida statute providing
for a six-person jury in serious criminal cases. 2 8 1 Today, thirty-four
states allow juries of fewer than twelve in some courts in criminal
actions. 28 2
Similarly, since the decision of Patton v. United States2 83 in 1930,
unanimity in a twelve-member federal jury has been required for a
conviction. Yet even after "incorporating" the right to criminal jury
trial, the Supreme Court has never required unanimity in state juries.
In Apodaca v. Oregon,28 4 the Court upheld a conviction entered on a
ten-to-two jury vote. In Johnson v. Louisiana,285 it upheld a nine-to-
three conviction. The Court in Apodaca and Johnson-decided the
same day-could not agree on why these non-unanimous verdicts
passed constitutional muster. Eight of the nine Justices who decided
the cases agreed that juror unanimity requirements in state criminal
cases should track those in federal cases. However, four Justices ar-
gued that unanimous verdicts should no longer be required even in
278. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 349-50. Today, however, federal criminal defendants
may waive their right to a twelve-member jury and stipulate in writing to a lesser
number. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
279. See 2 STORY, supra note 229, § 1772.
280. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
281. Id. at 98-101. But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230-33 (1978) (striking
down five-member state jury as violating Due Process Clause). It is not clear
under what principle a six-member state jury conforms with the due process re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment but a five-member state jury does not. See
STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 274, § 1.1, at 7-8 ("Although the Court unani-
mously agreed in Ballew that a Georgia criminal trial to a jury of five persons
deprived the defendant of his right to trial by jury under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, the Court did not agree on a reason for a constitutional distinction
between a six-person and a five-person jury [the empirical studies cited in Justice
Blackmun's Ballew concurrence] tended to undermine the foundation of Williams
rather than constitute a foundation for the distinction in Ballew.").
282. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 274, § 2.1, at 39 & n.4 (citing NAT'L CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM: A SURVEY 5 (1976) [hereinafter
NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE CouRTs]). The States are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 41-43. In North Dakota, no statute
authorizes juries to be smaller than twelve. Id. at 44.
283. 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
284. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
285. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
2005]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
federal jury trials, while four argued that unanimity should be re-
quired in both state and federal trials.
In casting the deciding vote in both cases, Justice Powell estab-
lished that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity in federal jury
trials, but the Fourteenth Amendment does not require unanimity in
state jury trials.2 86 This bifurcated rule remains the law today, and
has been endorsed by Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist. 28 7
Today, only four states permit nonunanimous verdicts in criminal
cases. 28 8 The constitutions of two other states permit the legislature
to adopt nonunanimous verdicts in non-felony criminal cases.28 9 Al-
though a substantial supermajority of states requires unanimity, the
Supreme Court has never imposed this requirement on outlying
states. The Court has never reversed any state criminal conviction
obtained by a non-unanimous jury verdict, regardless of the closeness
of the jury vote.
The Supreme Court, after Duncan, continued to define what as-
pects of the right to jury trial were "incorporated" against the states.
In a few instances, the Court disallowed jury procedures that were
being used in only one state or city.290 More often, the Court found no
violation, even when reviewing practices unique to one jurisdiction. 29 1
Thus, "incorporation" of the Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury
286. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 369-71 (Powell, J.).
287. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("[Clonstitutional guarantees are trivialized by the insistence on mechanical uni-
formity between state and federal practice. There is, of course, no reason why the
state and federal rules must be the same."); accord id. at 40 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
288. STARR & McCORMICK, supra note 274, § 2.2, at 40 & n.4 (citing NAT'L CENTER FOR
STATE COuRTs, supra note 282, at 9). The states are Louisiana, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, and Texas. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; OiA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST.
art. I, § 11. The Texas Constitution contains no provision specifically authorizing
nonunanimous criminal juries. See TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("In all criminal pros-
ecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.").
289. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring five-sixths verdict in misdemeanor cases);
MONT. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (requiring two-thirds verdict in misdemeanor cases).
290. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (holding that six member non-unani-
mous juries, used only in Louisiana, violate Fourteenth Amendment); Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 117 (1970) (holding that mandatory bench trials for crimes
with sentences potentially exceeding six months, by then used only in New York
City, violate Fourteenth Amendment).
291. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (holding that
jury not required in trial of a DUI charge, even though conviction would require a
mandatory jail term of at least two days); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (holding that state juvenile criminal proceedings need not offer jury
trials); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) (holding that "two-tier"
trial system in state court permitting trial by jury only in a de novo trial following
appeal does not violate Fourteenth Amendment, even though identical system in
federal court was previously held to violate Sixth Amendment in Callan v. Wil-
son, 127 U.S. 540 (1888)).
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trial, which might have heralded significant change in the substantive
law of a great many states, ended up changing the law of a small num-
ber of states in a small class of cases.
The Supreme Court in Duncan predicted that "[iut seems very un-
likely to us that our decision today will require widespread changes in
state criminal processes."29 2 Had it subsequently "incorporated" the
federal jury size or unanimity requirements, it would have under-
mined its own prediction. Instead, the Court made its prediction come
true.
2 9 3
F. Notice of Charges
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation."294 The requirement that criminal de-
fendants receive prompt notice of the charges against them has long
been understood as an essential element of due process of law. 2 95 In-
deed, the requirement that a criminal defendant is entitled to receive
notice of the charges against her is sufficiently well-settled in state
and federal criminal procedure that the Supreme Court has never re-
versed a state criminal conviction solely for denying this right. The
Court did, however, express dicta in Oliver, stating that the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is "incorporated"
via the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on state power. 29 6
292. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968).
293. Even Duncan itself did not affect many criminal trials. As the Court noted in
Duncan, "every American State, including Louisiana, uses the jury extensively,
and imposes very serious punishments only after a trial at which the defendant
has a right to a jury's verdict." Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
294. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
295. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648-49 (2004) ("For more than a cen-
tury the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy
that right they must first be notified.' It is equally fundamental that the right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.'" (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)
(quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)))). Before the Civil War, the Supreme Court originally
developed this interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause in
civil cases, rather than criminal cases. This may be due to the fact that the Sixth
Amendment's express notice requirement applied directly to criminal cases,
whereas only due process applied in civil cases. See, e.g., Boswell's Lessee v. Otis,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 350 (1850) ("No principle is more vital to the administration
ofjustice, than that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without
notice, and an opportunity to make his defence."); accord Nations v. Johnson, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 195, 203 (1860).
296. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to reasonable notice of a
charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his
day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence . . ").
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In 1948, when Oliver was decided-and still today-forty-seven
state constitutions expressly guaranteed the right of a criminal defen-
dant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Two other states, Nevada 29 7 and North Dakota,298 have always
expressly protected the same right by statute. Idaho, the only state
with no express constitutional or statutory guarantee, has always pro-
tected the right of criminal defendants to be informed of the charges
against them as an element of the Idaho Constitution's due process
clause. 2 99
The Oliver case itself arose in Michigan, a state whose constitution
then (as now) guaranteed that "[iun every criminal prosecution, the
accused shall have the right . . .to be informed of the nature of the
accusation."30 0 Michigan courts both before and after Oliver always
297. NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.075(1) (2004) ("The indictment or the information must be
a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged."). The Nevada statute also provides:
The indictment or information must state for each count the official or
customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of
law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated. Error in the
citation or its omission is not a ground for dismissal of the indictment or
information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not
mislead the defendant to his prejudice.
Id. § 173.075(3). Predecessor versions of these statutes have been in effect since
Nevada achieved statehood in 1864. See, e.g., State v. McKiernan, 30 P. 831, 832
(Nev. 1882) (finding that an indictment is "sufficient if the offense is 'clearly and
distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, in such a manner as to en-
able a person of common understanding to know what is intended.'") (citation
omitted); accord State v. Raymond, 117 P. 17, 18 (Nev. 1911); State v. Switzer,
145 P. 925, 926 (Nev. 1914).
298. Two years before North Dakota attained statehood, it enacted a Code of Criminal
Procedure containing all of the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. N.D.
CODE CRIM. P. of 1877, § 11, currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-06
(2003). Included in this code, which has remained in effect ever since, was a
guarantee that: "In all criminal prosecutions the party accused has the right...
[t]o demand and be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." Id. § 29-
01-06(2). This provision has never been understood to mean anything different
than the identical provision in the Sixth Amendment.
299. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13 ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law."). See, e.g., State v. Kouni, 76 P.2d 917 (Idaho
1938) (finding that a law authorizing commissioner of law enforcement to sus-
pend driver's license after involvement in accident resulting in personal injury,
without notice or hearing, violated due process); Bear Lake County v. Budge, 75
P. 614 (Idaho 1904) (finding that due process requires, as a condition precedent to
a judicial determination affecting right to life, liberty, or property, that personal
service of process be obtained when practicable; constructive service can be pro-
vided only when actual service is impracticable).
300. The Oliver case arose under article II, section 19 of the Michigan Constitution of
1908. That constitution was later replaced in 1963. However, the provision at
issue in Oliver was retained in the 1963 constitution, and is now codified at MICH.
CONST. art. 1, § 20.
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enforced this constitutional requirement.3 0 1 Consistent with this
state constitutional requirement, the defendant in Oliver did, in fact,
receive clear notice of the nature and cause of the contempt-of-court
charge brought against him in state court. 302 The defendant never
claimed otherwise, and the United States Supreme Court's reference
to the "incorporation" of this right in the Oliver case was pure dicta.
In the half-century since Oliver was decided, the "incorporation" of
the criminal defendant's right to receive notice of charges has led the
Supreme Court to reverse state criminal convictions in only one subse-
quent case-Cole v. Arkansas,303 in which several labor unionists
were charged with unlawfully assembling to promote the use of vio-
lence in connection with a labor dispute. At trial in state court, the
defendants were convicted, notwithstanding the prosecution's failure
at trial to present any evidence pertaining to one essential element of
the offense.304 On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not reach
the defendants' claim that the evidence presented at trial had been
insufficient. Instead, the court affirmed the convictions on the alter-
native ground that even if the offense element at issue had not been
proved, the record evidence was sufficient to support convictions for a
related offense with which the defendants had not been charged.3 05
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "[i]t is as much a violation of due process to send an accused to
prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as
it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made."3 06
Linking this due process principle to the more specific "notice of
charges" language of the Sixth Amendment, the Cole Court opined
that "[n]o principle of procedural due process is more clearly estab-
lished than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard
in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the
constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all
301. See, e.g., People v. Traughber, 439 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Mich. 1989) ("An information
must be specific for two reasons: it affords the defendant due notice of the charges
against him and protection against double jeopardy should he be retried ....
[T]he dispositive question is whether the defendant knew what acts he was being
tried for so he could adequately put forth a defense.") (citation omitted); People v.
Hamilton, 38 N.W. 921 (Mich. 1888) (dismissing information for failing to specifi-
cally describe acts that defendant was alleged to have committed); Enders v. Peo-
ple, 20 Mich. 233 (1870) (holding that an indictment that describes the offense in
the generic words of the statute is constitutionally insufficient if it fails to aver
any fact essential to the description of the offense).
302. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 259 (1948) (describing judge's statement to defendant
that defendant was being charged with contempt-of-court because defendant's
grand jury testimony did not "jell" with testimony of other grand jury witnesses).
303. 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
304. Id. at 198-200.
305. Cole v. State, 202 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Ark. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
306. Cole, 333 U.S. at 201.
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courts, state or federal."307 In essence, the Cole Court held that where
the prosecution fails to prove the offense for which a criminal defen-
dant was charged, the United States Constitution bars conviction of
the defendant for a different offense for which the defendant was not
charged. While this holding seemingly changed the substantive law of
Arkansas, it does not appear to have changed the law of any other
state. Moreover, the Cole Court's discussion of "procedural due pro-
cess" suggests that the Court might have reached the same conclusion
purely on that basis, even if the Court had never specifically "incorpo-
rated" the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation. 30 Thus, the
"incorporation" of the Sixth Amendment right to "notice of charges"
has, at most, changed the substantive law of one state in one particu-
lar respect.
G. Right To Counsel
In 1669, Rhode Island became the first government in the English-
speaking world to protect the right of criminal defendants to the assis-
tance of counsel when it passed a statute declaring that "it shall be the
lawful privilege of any man that is indicted, to procure an attornye
[sic] to plead any poynt [sic] of law that may make for the clearing of
his innocencye [sic]."309 By the time of the American Revolution, the
right to counsel was well-established in all the colonies.31o
Inexplicably, George Mason's influential Virginia Declaration of
Rights of 1776 made no reference to the right to counsel. Today, Vir-
ginia's Constitution of 1971 still makes no reference to this right,
which has been expressly protected by the constitutions of every other
state.3 1 1
307. Id. (citing Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273).
308. Id.
309. LEVY, supra note 48, at 356 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND (1636-1792) 238-39 (John Rus-
sell Bartlett ed., 1856)). England did not pass its first statute guaranteeing the
right to counsel until 1836. WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 8 (1955). That statute provided that "all persons tried for felo-
nies should be admitted, after the close of the case for the prosecution, to make
full answer and defence thereto, by counsel learned in the law, or by attorney in
courts where attornies practice as counsel." Id. at 11 (citing 6 & 7 W. 4, ch. 114,
§ 1 (1836)).
310. See BEANEY, supra note 309, at 14-18.
311. See id. at 81 & app. at 237. Three different verbal formulations of this right
predominate the state constitutions. Nine states-Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisi-
ana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and West Virginia-use
the phrasing of the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. Nineteen states-Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Mississippi, New
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The omission of the right to counsel from Virginia's series of consti-
tutions3 12 did not signify disapproval of the right. In 1786, before the
United States Bill of Rights was drafted, Virginia enacted a statute
guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to retain counsel for assis-
tance at trial.3 13 Two years later, when it ratified the United States
Constitution, Virginia proposed a list of twenty rights that ought to be
protected by the forthcoming United States Bill of Rights.314 The
eighth of these suggestions was that "[i] n all criminal and capital pros-
ecutions a man hath a right to . . . be allowed counsel in his favor
. *..."315 In fact, Virginia was one of only two of the thirteen original
states to propose that the United States Bill of Rights should contain a
provision protecting the right of criminal defendants to counsel.316
By the early twentieth century, Virginia had widened its statutory
protection of the right to counsel to include a right to appointed coun-
sel for indigent felony defendants. 3 17 Also by the early twentieth cen-
tury, the Virginia Supreme Court had established that the right to
counsel was protected by the Virginia Constitution's "law of the land"
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin-use a form employed in some of the early state
constitutions, those of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania in particular, to the ef-
fect that the accused shall have the right "to be fully heard in his defence by
himself, or his counsel, at his election." MAsS. CONST. dec. of rts. art. XII. Eigh-
teen states-Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South
Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming-adhere to an alternate form pio-
neered in New York and Delaware providing that "[in any trial in any court
whatever the accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Three states use their own unique phrasing.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 14 ("Every person charged with an offense against the
laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel."); MD. CONST.
dec. of rts. art. XXI ("In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with
crime hath a right .. .to be allowed counsel."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("In all
criminal prosecutions, every man has the right . . .to have counsel for his de-
fense."). To this Author's knowledge, no significance has ever been attached by
any court to these verbal differences.
312. Virginia ratified new constitutions in 1776, 1865, 1870, 1902, and 1971.
313. BEANEY, supra note 309, at 19 & n.52 (citing 12 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA
343 (Hening ed. 1823)).
314. Id. at 22.
315. Id. (citing 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 658 (2d ed. 1901)).
316. Id. The other original state that proposed such a provision was North Carolina.
Id.
317. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-157, 19.2-159 (1995) (enacted in 1950); see also 1916 Va.
Acts ch. 373, codified at VA. CODE § 3518 (1942) (repealed 1950) (authorizing a
trial judge to appoint counsel to defend "a poor person charged with an offense
that may be punishable by death, or by confinement in the penitentiary for a
period of more than ten years, [and] he may direct that a sum of money not to
exceed twenty-five dollars shall be paid out of the treasury of such county or city"
to compensate appointed counsel).
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clause,318 and that this right included the right of an indigent crimi-
nal defendant to have counsel appointed at his request. 3 19
While the states unanimously agreed that the right to retain coun-
sel should be protected, a controversial consequence of the "incorpora-
tion" of the right to counsel was the subsequent "incorporation," in
Gideon v. Wainwright,32o of the Sixth Amendment requirement that
counsel be appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants. Ap-
pointment of counsel began not in the federal courts, but rather in
those of several states. As early as 1718, Pennsylvania adopted a stat-
ute requiring the appointment of counsel in all capital cases.3 2 1 In
1750, the practice of appointing counsel to all indigent criminal de-
fendants so requesting was established in Connecticut, though not
codified by statute. 32 2 In 1795, New Jersey provided by statute that
courts must "assign to such person, if not of ability to procure counsel,
such counsel, not exceeding two, as he or she shall desire."3 2 3 The
practice of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Connecticut, however, ap-
parently was not emulated by many other state or federal courts dur-
ing the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. 3 24
The catalyst sparking more courts and legislatures to begin requir-
ing the appointment of council may have been the promulgation in
1930 of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Criminal Proce-
318. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("[I]n criminal prosecutions a man ... shall not be deprived
of life or liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers."). See,
e.g., Watkins v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E.2d 670, 671 (Va. 1940) ("While there is no
specific provision in the Constitution of Virginia guaranteeing to persons accused
of crime the right to have the assistance of counsel, this court recognized the right
to be a fundamental one. It is, we think, one of the rights guaranteed to an ac-
cused under our Bill of Rights." (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E. 784,
787 (Va. 1895); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8) (footnote omitted)); accord Fitzgerald v.
Smyth, 74 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1953); Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 46 S.E.2d 413 (Va.
1948).
319. Watkins, 6 S.E.2d at 671 ("It is well settled that courts of record having criminal
jurisdiction possess the inherent authority, independent of statute, to appoint
counsel to defend paupers and other indigent persons charged with crime.") (em-
phasis added and citations omitted); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 46 S.E.2d 406,
409-10 (Va. 1948) ("The phrase, 'the law of the land,'... mean[s] that no person
in a criminal case shall be denied the right to the assistance of counsel of his own
selection, and that no person indicted for an infamous offense who is financially
unable to engage counsel shall be denied the aid of counsel if this fact is brought
to the attention of the trial judge.").
320. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Gideon case arose from Florida.
321. BEANEY, supra note 309, at 16 (citing 3 STATUES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 199
(Busch, 1896)).
322. Id. (citing 2 ZEPHANLAH SwIFr, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT 392
(1795)).
323. Id. at 20 (citing Acts of General Assembly of New Jersey, 1791-96, at 1012).
324. But see Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 249 (1859) (finding due process
clause of Wisconsin Constitution requires appointment of counsel for indigents
charged with felonies).
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dure, which contained a provision placing on the trial judge the duty
of appointing counsel at the arraignment of one accused of a felony
who needed counsel and was without counsel.325 Shortly after the of-
ficial draft of the Code began circulating, one federal court declared
that "[i]t goes without saying that an accused who is unable by reason
of poverty to employ counsel is entitled to be defended in all his rights
as fully and to the same extent as is an accused who is able to employ
his own counsel to represent him."326 In 1938, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants in all criminal cases in federal
courts.3 27 At that time, the Supreme Court declined to extend this
requirement to state courts.328
During the 1930s and 1940s, however, as the appointment of coun-
sel for indigent defendants became entrenched in the federal courts,
many states also began to require it. By the late 1940s, seven state
supreme courts had construed their state constitutional "right to coun-
sel" provisions to mandate such a requirement. 32 9 Furthermore, every
state, by 1955, had enacted a statute requiring the appointment of
counsel in at least some criminal cases.
The least generous statutory provision, enacted in eight states, re-
quired the trial court to appoint counsel in capital cases only.330 Two
325. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 209 (1930). The Code, in turn, may have been
influenced by the local practice in some federal district courts. See, e.g., Local
Rule 24 (N.D. Cal. 1926) ("It shall be the duty of every attorney to act as such
without compensation whenever he is appointed by the court to act for any person
accused of crime who has no other attorney.").
326. Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1931).
327. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 ("The Sixth Amendment withholds from
federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an
accused of life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.") (foot-
note omitted).
328. See id. at 463 & n.11 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833);
Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 557 (1874)). Both of the cited cases
stand for the proposition that the United States Bill of Rights restricts the ac-
tions of the United States government but does not directly restrict the states.
329. See BEANEY, supra note 309, at 82-84 nn.7-16, 20 (citing People ex rel. Moore v.
Hunt, 16 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1939); People v. McLaughlin, 53 N.E.2d 356
(N.Y. 1944); In re Jingles, 165 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1946); People v. Avilez, 194 P.2d 829
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Cook v. State, 172 S.E. 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934); Jones
v. State, 195 S.E. 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938); Batchelor v. State, 125 N.E. 773 (Ind.
1920); Bielich v. State, 126 N.E. 220 (Ind. 1920); State v. Crosby, 50 P. 127 (Nev.
1897); State v. MacKinnon, 168 P. 330 (Nev. 1917); State v. Garcia, 142 P.2d 552
(N.M. 1943); Alexander v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 645, 290 N.W. 718 (1940), cert. de-
nied, 311 U.S. 682 (1940)).
330. The eight states were Alabama, Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. See id. at 84 & n.24 (citing statu-
tory provisions in effect in 1955). The Pennsylvania provision, PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. §19-783 (Purdon 1930), was the same provision that had been enacted in
1718. STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 199 (Busch, 1896). The Texas provi-
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of these eight states, however, began requiring the appointment of
counsel in all felony cases between 1955 and 1960.331 Three states
required by statute the appointment of counsel in capital cases or
cases carrying a potential life sentence, 33 2 but in one of these states
the state supreme court had held that all criminal defendants were
entitled to appointed counsel under the state constitution's right to
counsel clause,3 33 and in another, the normal practice was to appoint
counsel in all felony cases, despite the statute's limitation.334 One
state, New Hampshire, required counsel to be appointed to any indi-
gent defendant facing a term of more than three years in prison. 335
Three states authorized the trial judge to appoint counsel on behalf of
any indigent criminal defendant, but did not require him to do so.3 36
In each of the remaining thirty-seven states, the provision for ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants in effect in 1963
was at least as generous as that required by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion that year in Gideon.33 7 As of 1955, nine states had enacted stat-
utes requiring the appointment of counsel for any indigent criminal
defendant so requesting, but not requiring that the accused be advised
of this right.338 This approach comports with the minimum required
by the Court in Gideon. By 1950, however, state courts in at least five
of these nine states had ruled that indigent defendants must be in-
sion, TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 10a (Vernon 1936), had been interpreted by
Texas courts to permit a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial before being
appointed counsel. See Wilson v. State, 252 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
331. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Gen. R. 10 (1958); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 494 (Vernon
1959). Both are cited in Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1962).
332. Maine and Nebraska had such statutes in 1955. See BEANEY, supra note 309, at
84 & n.25 (citing statutory provisions in effect in 1955). When Hawaii joined the
Union in 1959, its first statute provided for appointment of counsel only in capital
cases and cases where a life sentence could be imposed. HAw. REV. L. § 253-5
(1955), cited in McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 122 (1961).
333. Alexander, 137 Neb. 645, 290 N.W. 718 (interpreting NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11).
334. The practice in Hawaii, both before and after it achieved statehood in 1959, was
to appoint counsel in all felony cases. Kamisar, supra note 331, at 19 n.91.
335. BEANEY, supra note 309, at 84 & n.25 (citing statutory provision in effect in 1955).
336. These states were Maryland, Michigan, and Rhode Island. Id. at 84-85 & n.26
(citing statutory provisions in effect in 1955). Michigan, however, beginning in
1946, required by supreme court rule that all Michigan trial courts "advise the
accused that he is entitled ... to have counsel, and that in case he is financially
unable to provide counsel that the court will, if accused so requests, appoint coun-
sel for him." Id. at 87-88 & n.36 (citing MicH. CT. R. 35-A § 1 (1946)). The rule is
quoted in full in People v. Bumpus, 94 N.W.2d 854, 855 (Mich. 1959).
337. See Kamisar, supra note 331, at 17 (calculating the number thirty-seven).
338. These nine states were Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Washington, and Wyoming. BEANEY, supra note 309, at 85 & n.28
(citing statutory provisions in effect in 1955).
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formed of their right to appointed counsel. 33 9 Thirteen states in 1955
required the appointment of counsel whenever requested, or, when not
requested, if the court felt it necessary. 3 40 Fourteen state statutes re-
quired the court to advise the accused of his right to have counsel ap-
pointed if he is indigent, or to appoint counsel in every case unless the
defendant objected. 34 ' In one state, Nebraska, the right to appointed
counsel had been held by the state supreme court to adhere to all indi-
339. The Indiana Supreme Court interpreted the right to counsel provision of its con-
stitution, IND. CONST. art. I, § 13, to require that trial courts advise the accused of
his right to counsel, and offer counsel to him in "all criminal cases." Batchelor v.
State, 125 N.E. 773 (Ind. 1920); Bielich v. State, 126 N.E. 220 (Ind. 1920). Later,
the court clarified that "all criminal cases" included both appeals, State v.
Hilgemann, 34 N.E.2d 129 (Ind. 1941), and misdemeanor cases, Bolkovac v.
State, 98 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1951). Thus, Indiana provided significantly more pro-
tection for the right to counsel than Gideon would require. The Louisiana and
Kentucky Supreme Courts "interpreted" their statutes to require trial courts to
advise all defendants appearing without counsel of their right to have counsel
appointed if indigent. State v. Youchunas, 174 So. 356 (La. 1937); Gholson v.
Commonwealth, 212 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1948). The Supreme Courts of Illinois and
Missouri, in 1948 and 1945, respectively, promulgated court rules requiring that
criminal defendants be advised of their statutory right to have counsel appointed.
BEANEY, supra note 309, at 88 & nn.39-41 (citing court rules).
340. These states were Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin. BEANEY, supra note 309, at 85-86 & n.29 (citing statutory provisions in
effect in 1955). Of these states, the Georgia and New Mexico courts had inter-
preted their state constitutions to require the appointment of counsel in all cases
unless knowingly waived. Id. at 82-83 & nn.10, 15, (citing Cook v. State, 172
S.E. 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934); Jones v. State, 195 S.E. 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938);
State v. Garcia, 142 P.2d 552 (N.M. 1943)). The supreme courts of West Virginia
and New Jersey had promulgated court rules containing the same requirement.
BEANEY, supra note 309, at 88-89 & nn.43-44 (citing court rules). In 1961, the
Colorado Supreme Court promulgated a rule requiring the appointment of coun-
sel in all cases. Kamisar, supra note 331, at 17 n.77 (citing Colo. R. Crim. P. 44
(1961)).
341. These states were Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Montana,
Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia. BEA-
NEY, supra note 309, at 85 & n.27 (citing statutory provisions in effect in 1955,
not including Hawaii and Alaska); Kamisar, supra note 331, at 17 & nn.76-78
(citing statutory provisions in effect in 1961, including Hawaii and Alaska); see
also McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 119-22 (1961) (appendix to opinion of Doug-
las, J.) (cataloguing state law regarding appointed counsel). Professor Kamisar
notes that Colorado began requiring the appointment of counsel in all cases
shortly after the McNeal decision, and that Justice Douglas appears to have over-
looked Michigan, which already required the appointment of counsel at the time
McNeal was decided, but which does not appear in Justice Douglas's appendix.
Kamisar, supra note 331. Interestingly, Virginia, the one state without a right to
counsel provision in its constitution, offered by statute the highest level of protec-
tion of the right.
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gent criminal defendants, though a state statute provided for ap-
pointed counsel only in rape and murder cases. 34 2
Not only did thirty-seven states require appointment of counsel at
least for all indigent felony defendants requesting it, but in eight of
the remaining thirteen states, the practice of appointing counsel had
developed without benefit of any statute or rule of court.34 3 Even in
Florida, the state from which Gideon arose, public defenders had been
established locally in Miami, Tampa, and Fort Lauderdale before
1960.344 Thus, by 1963, only in Alabama, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and rural Florida, were most indigent criminal
defendants charged with non-capital felonies unlikely to be able to ob-
tain appointed counsel. Only in the rural areas of eight other states
was there any chance that such defendants might not be able to obtain
appointed counsel. For the vast majority of Americans, and even of
indigent American non-capital felony defendants, the Supreme
Court's decision in Gideon did not change the law of their states, or
affect their (already established) ability to obtain appointed
counsel.345
Moreover, even in the minority of states and regions where
Gideon's "incorporation" of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cre-
ated a new substantive right for indigent criminal defendants, the im-
pact of this new right on state criminal procedure may not be as
significant as it first might appear.
For although since Gideon v. Wainwright the Supreme Court has required
[state and local] government[s] to hire a lawyer for every felony defendant
who cannot afford one, the Court has never said how much the government
must pay, and it has imposed only the weakest of demands on the kind of the
representation the government purchases. 3 4 6
342. Alexander v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 645, 290 N.W. 718 (1940) (interpreting NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 11).
343. These states were Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Rhode Island. See Kamisar, supra note 331, at 67-74
(detailing local practices as explained by prosecutors, judges, and other authori-
ties in the thirteen states lacking appointment statutes covering all felony cases).
In these states, defendants in cities were highly likely to receive assistance of
counsel on request, though rural defendants were somewhat more likely to fall
between the cracks. Id. at 18-19. In Michigan, appointment of counsel was guar-
anteed by state supreme court rule. MICH. CT. R. 35-A § 1 (1946).
344. Kamisar, supra note 331, at 20.
345. In the post-Gideon era, three states have strongly endorsed the decision by ex-
pressly codifying the right to appointment of counsel for indigent criminal de-
fendants in their state constitutions. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (amended 1968);
LA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (ratified 1974); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15 (amended 1966).
346. David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights In Constitutional Criminal Proce-
dure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1280 (2002) (footnotes omitted); see also William J.
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Jus-
tice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997) (observing that legislatures dissatisfied with proce-
dural rules fashioned by courts can often resist by reducing the availability of
resources needed to take advantage of such rules).
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Despite the lack of federal guidance, state courts have begun to set
constitutional floors delineating minimum amounts the government
must pay to underwrite the defense of an indigent criminal defendant.
Thus, in 1984, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Mohave County's
practice of assigning legal representation of indigent defendants to the
lowest-bidding attorney, without considering the time or expenses
that would be necessary to adequately represent the defendants, or
the competency of the attorneys, failed to satisfy state (or federal) con-
stitutional requirements. 34 7 The Louisiana Supreme Court followed
suit in 1993, holding unconstitutional New Orleans's system under
which one typical court-appointed attorney representing indigent de-
fendants had been assigned to seventy active felony cases, and had
represented 418 defendants during a seven-month period.3 48 The at-
torney's clients were routinely incarcerated for thirty to seventy days
before he could meet with them, and the attorney had at least one
serious felony case set for trial on every trial date during the seven-
month period in question.349 Other state courts-including those of
Florida, the state from which Gideon arose-have relied upon evi-
dence of grossly overworked attorneys to revamp public defense sys-
tems under their jurisdiction. 3 50
Even in Gideon, one of the most celebrated and controversial cases
of the Warren Court's procedural revolution, the doctrine of "incorpo-
ration" did not alter the substantive law of more than a handful of
states. Moreover, even in that handful of affected states, the Gideon
decision appears only to have nudged the law a little bit forward, in
the same direction that the states were already moving.
V. CONCLUSION
The "incorporation" against the states of most of the rights set
forth in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments is among the most
347. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378-83 (Ariz. 1984) (citing ARIz. CONST. art. 2,
§§ 4, 24; U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI).
348. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 783-84, 791 (La. 1993) (citing LA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 13; U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial
Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1139 (Fla. 1990) (finding that the enor-
mous backlog of appellate cases assigned to public defenders would support state
habeas corpus relief for indigent appellants unless new funds were appropriated
within 60 days); State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 66-68 (Mo. 1981)
(establishing temporary guidelines to solve problem of providing legal assistance
to indigent defendants after state fund was exhausted), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982). In neither of these two cases did the state courts at issue expressly
rely on state constitutional right to counsel clauses. Instead, both courts appear
to have conflated state and federal constitutional standards.
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celebrated, 351 and most criticized, 352 aspects of the Supreme Court's
body of work. This attention is not unwarranted. In two respects,
"incorporation" helps ensure certain minimum protection for funda-
mental civil liberties. First, "incorporation" provides a federal forum
for the vindication of what would otherwise be state law rights. In
light of the strong federal interest in protecting all persons against
invidious discrimination, 353 the availability of an additional, neutral
forum in which unpopular individuals can seek adjudication of dis-
putes can only be salutary.354
Second, "incorporation" concentrates in the United States Supreme
Court the power to define the minimum level of protection of individ-
ual rights required by a particular constitutional provision.355 While
351. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, Truth and Legitimacy In the American Criminal
Process, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 698 (2000) ("The criminal process
revolution ... was the expression of a profound desire to return truth and demo-
cratic principle to America's legal institutions-a deliberate (albeit limited) effort
to attain moral redemption and regain institutional legitimacy.").
352. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and
Eastern Europe-and for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 7 (1996) (arguing
that incorporation "made the criminal justice system cumbersome, expensive-
and quite possibly less effective in deterring crime").
353. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976); see also Katkin, supra
note 71 (developing this theme).
354. See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06
(1977) (arguing that state courts often fail to protect the rights of unpopular indi-
viduals as forcefully as federal courts); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Alloca-
tion of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction
and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1779-81 (1992) (same);
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
213, 224-25 (1983) (supporting Neuborne's prediction). But cf Craig M. Bradley,
Are the State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment?, 77 GEO. L.J. 251, 253
(1988) (concluding that "[miost states are doing a fairly good job, some states a
poor job, and some, deciding most cases by unreported opinions, are hard to eval-
uate"); Barry Friedman, Under The Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211 (2004) (arguing that
individual rights are best protected when cases that raise both state and federal
issues can be litigated in both state and federal court systems). For an opposing
perspective, see William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COM-
MENT. 599, 619-21 (1999) (arguing that elected state judges can be more receptive
to rights-based claims than federal judges, because politics keeps judges sensitive
to concerns of minority voting blocs).
355. Notably, "incorporation" does not have the countervailing effect of empowering
the Supreme Court to set a maximum level of protection of individual rights, be-
cause states are free to protect rights that are not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Justice Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent
State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Fed-
eral Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 980 (1985) ("The first ten amendments [to the
United States Constitution] establish a foundation for the protection of human
liberty. A state may not undermine that foundation, but its constitution may
build additional protections above the federal floor."); accord Commonwealth v.
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this power is potentially transformative, in practice the Court has
wielded it quite sparingly. With respect to the rights enumerated in
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, the Court's "conventional-
ist"356 interpretations have rarely moved ahead of prevailing state
practice.3 57 Indeed, on the handful of occasions in which the Court
has sought to ratchet up the minimum level of protection for these
rights, it has quickly backed down when faced with criticism or resis-
tance.3 58 For this reason, the doctrine of "incorporation" has not sub-
stantially altered criminal procedure as it exists in the fifty states.3 5 9
During the decades that the Bill of Rights has been "incorporated,"
many state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to protect
the rights of criminal suspects and defendants more expansively than
the United States Constitution. 360 Commentators, including many
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) ("Although we may accord weight to fed-
eral decisions where they 'are found to be logically persuasive and well reasoned,
paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional
guarantees,' we are free to reject the conclusions of the United States Supreme
Court so long as we remain faithful to the minimum guarantees established by
the United States Constitution.") (internal citations omitted).
356. Professor Thomas Merrill uses this term to describe a jurisprudence extremely
deferential to precedent, for the purpose of shutting off the courts from being
used as a vehicle to achieve social change. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke,
19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 511 (1996) ("When the meaning of an enacted
text is not plain, the conventionalist interpreter seeks out not the original mean-
ing but the conventional meaning-the consensus view about the meaning in the
legal community of today.").
357. The Court's declaration that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to ap-
pointed counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), for example, was
consistent with the approach taken by the overwhelming majority of states in
1963. See supra section III.F. Although the Gideon decision required a handful
of states to modify their practice to conform to the national majority, the decision
was well-received when delivered and is no longer particularly controversial
today.
358. The most significant cases in this regard are Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
which "incorporated" the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations,
and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which required state police officers
to give warnings before interrogation. See Part III, supra. While both of these
cases remain good law, the Court has vitiated their significance by carving out
new exceptions to their application at every opportunity.
359. Cf Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the
Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1361, 1366 (2004) ("Of course, whenever a locality is out of step with an emerging
or established national consensus and the Supreme Court validates that consen-
sus, its decision will be countermajoritarian in a way-but that kind of counter-
majoritarian decision making can occur even without judicial review.").
360. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions As Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535,
548 & n.77 (1986) ("Between 1970 and 1984, state courts, increasingly reluctant
to follow the federal lead, have handed down over 250 published opinions holding
that the constitutional minimums set by the United States Supreme Court were
insufficient to satisfy the more stringent requirements of state constitutional
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state judges, have noted and encouraged the trend towards protecting
civil liberties through a "new judicial federalism." 36 1 As state consti-
tutions have increasingly become vehicles for protecting civil liberties,
however, the significance of the "incorporated" Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments has correspondingly diminished.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has enthusiasti-
cally defended the prerogatives of the states in our system of constitu-
tional federalism.3 6 2 If this trend continues, then the Supreme Court
may some day reconsider "incorporation." Without "incorporation,"
the states would experience neither the reign of injustice feared by
some, nor the liberation of the police sought by others. Rather, with or
without "incorporation," state criminal procedure would remain sub-
stantially unchanged. Throughout American history, the states have
always emulated United States constitutional law both in drafting
and interpreting their own constitutions. Concomitantly, the United
States Supreme Court has often been influenced by state constitu-
tional decisions. States have shown no inclination to reduce the rights
of criminal suspects and defendants below the minimum levels cur-
rently required by the "incorporation" doctrine. For this reason, there
may be less at stake in the "incorporation" debate than commentators
on both sides have believed.
law." (citing Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1, 2 (B. McGraw ed., 1985))).
361. See id.; see also, e.g., Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional Law, New
Judicial Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339 (2004);
Justice William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Vern Countryman, Why a State Bill of
Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Hon. Hans A. Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Hon. Mar-
garet H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate To Learn From Their Chil-
dren": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633 (2004).
362. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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